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The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential 
Decision Directive 56?  The U.S. government recognized the need for a more systemized 
method for managing the interagency response to complex contingency operations, after 
their experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.  In 1997, President Clinton signed PDD 
56: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.  
To determine the impact of this directive, this thesis uses a pre-PDD 56 and post-PDD 56 
case study comparison methodology treating PDD 56 as the intervention.  U.S. 
participation in Bosnia from 1995 until 1996 is the pre-PDD 56 case study, and U.S. 
participation in Kosovo from 1998 until 1999 is the post-PDD 56 case study.  The Bosnia 
and Kosovo case studies are compared using six variables (type, depth, and timing of 
planning, decision process, funding, and monitoring and modification).  Subsequent 
improvements to PDD 56 illustrate the positive impact that PDD 56 has had on 
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In May 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56: The 
Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.  Its 
purpose was to institutionalize lessons from Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia to improve the 
U.S. government’s interagency management of complex contingency operations – 
coordinating planning across multiple government agencies.  Complex contingency 
operations are multi-dimensional, with diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and military 
components, all of which rely on civil-military unity of effort to ensure a comprehensive 
response.  The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential 
Decision Directive 56?  Answering this question is important because of the continued 
proliferation of complex contingency operations.  These operations will continue to be a 
challenge for the United States.  It is also important because the tools developed for 
managing complex contingency operations may also be useful in managing other issues 
that span more than one agency in the U.S. government.   
The impact of PDD 56 is determined through a pre-PDD 56 and post-PDD 56 
case study comparison, treating PDD 56 as the intervention.  U.S. operations in Bosnia in 
1995 through 1996 provide the pre-PDD 56 case, and operations in Kosovo from 1998 
through 1999 provide the post-PDD 56 case.  Six variables are used to compare the two 
cases: type of planning, depth of planning, timing of planning, decision process, funding, 
and monitoring and modification.  Additionally, modifications to PDD 56 are used to 
illustrate the directive’s continued impact.  From this analysis it is determined that PDD 
56 had a positive impact on the interagency response to complex contingency operations.  
The operation in Kosovo was planned in advance, across the interagency environment, 
using the process laid out in PDD 56.  Decision-makers were able to make informed 
decisions based on systematic planning.  Congress allocated adequate funding two 
months in advance, and the Kosovo Excom provided a day-to-day oversight of the 
operation as it unfolded in Kosovo.  The planning document developed by the United 
States for the Kosovo mission was adopted by the international community to guide 
international preparations and mandates as well, making for a more integrated and faster 


























The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the 
military’s scope, the happier I will be!  Sometimes I think I live ten years 
each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic 
matters. 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, North Africa, 19421 
Complex contingency operations are defined as “multi-dimensional operations 
composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, 
economic development, and security.”2  Several examples of complex contingency 
operations stand out: United States military involvement in the implementation of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia from 1995 to the present; U.S. 
military provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in northern Iraq in 1991; and 
foreign humanitarian assistance operations in Africa and Bangladesh.3  Since the end of 
the Cold War the proliferation of complex contingency operations has made it more 
difficult for agencies in the United States Government to work together.  Failure to 
coordinate civil-military efforts has been a common problem of U.S. operations, as noted 
in the after action reports or lessons learned reports that followed U.S. operations in 
Panama, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia.  A common feature of 
these complex contingency operations is multi-dimensional problems, including 
interrelated security, economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues.  The requisite 
response to them also was multi-dimensional, placing a premium on civil-military unity 
of effort.  For example, if a humanitarian crisis is caused by a security problem, then 
dealing with the humanitarian crisis without addressing the security problem, does little 
more than make the responders feel better, and frequently delays or extends the suffering 
                                                 
1 Beyond Jointness: The Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, 
National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies Symposium, 2-3 June 1999, iv. 
2 The White House, “White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex 
Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56,” May 1997; available from 
http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_docs/appendix_A.htm; Internet; accessed 22 July 2000.   
3 The White House, 1997.  The definition of complex contingency operations does not include 
“domestic disaster relief or…relatively routine or small-scale operations, or…military operations conducted 
in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations 
and international armed conflict.” 
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of the victims.4  This chapter defines and describes the following: complex contingency 
operations, the interagency environment, wicked problems, Presidential Decision 
Directive 56, the research question, the research design, and the thesis structure. 
A. COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Some of the tasks in complex contingency operations that require significant 
civil-military unity of effort include humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities and 
demobilization of former warring factions, resettlement of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, public security and administration of justice, war crimes and human 
rights, governance, open media, and economic reconstruction.5  In many of these tasks, 
military forces are the only ones that can provide the security necessary to carry out the 
civilian aspects of the operation.  For instance, in Somalia, military forces provided 
security for food convoys.  In Bosnia military forces monitored and verified compliance 
with the separation of forces and cantonment of weapons.  In Kosovo the military 
provided security for refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their homes.  
In Haiti the military forces provided training for local police forces.  In Bosnia military 
forces have aided in the apprehension of indicted war criminals.  Some specialized 
military forces such as Civil Affairs personnel have been used in many of these 
operations to help set up basic government services, such as providing public 
administration, education, and health services.  In Bosnia military forces were used to 
occupy a radio station tower to prevent its use by those who would disturb the 
implementation of the peace agreement.  Lastly, specialized military forces such as the 
combat engineers are frequently deployed quickly at the beginning of an operation to 
help repair basic public services such as electricity and water.  Civil-military 
collaboration is critical to accomplish these tasks successfully, quickly, and efficiently.   
The 1994 U.S. operation in Haiti was a benchmark for drawing attention to the 
need for interagency cooperation, defined as “a process for coordinating executive branch 
decision making when issues involve multiple agencies of the government.”6  Although 
                                                 
4 Kimberly A. Maynard, Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xi-xii.  
5 Beyond Jointness, 3-6. 
6 Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, 13 August 1998; 
available from http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_docs; Internet; accessed 29 May 2000. 
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generally upheld as an interagency cooperation success story, the complex contingency 
operation in Haiti in 1994 provides specific examples of problems stemming from the 
failure of interagency coordination.  While Operation Uphold Democracy is generally 
upheld as a success story for the interagency community, it was far from perfect.  
Following are two examples from Haiti that show common problems that can arise in 
complex contingency operations.  First, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) agreed to launch a jobs program and the Department of Justice and USAID 
agreed to create the Haitian Justice Department.  When USAID was unable to secure 
funding for the programs they were passed off to the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Forces deployed in Haiti placing a larger burden on the military forces already deployed.7  
The failure of one agency to fulfill its commitments adds pressure on others and can 
threaten the entire operation’s success.  Second, one of the greatest assets the military 
brings to complex contingency operations is the ability to airlift large amounts of 
equipment, supplies, and personnel anywhere in the world, yet in Haiti, USAID personnel 
could not get on military transports because they were not granted access into the United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) movement planning system.8  
Civilian agency personnel are frequently left to find transportation on commercial or 
contract airlines, which can be problematic when traveling into a crisis region where the 
public infrastructure may have been destroyed or heavily damaged.  Interagency 
collaboration in the planning phases of a complex contingency operations helps to 
address these potential disconnections between agencies, so they are not left to the 
operators in field to fix once they have become significant problems.   
B. THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT 
Because so many of the tasks in complex contingency operations are multi-
dimensional, the interagency environment is complex.  The National Security Council 
(NSC), Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) are traditional participants in the national security arena.  The 
unique nature of complex contingency operations usually brings additional players to the 
                                                 
7 Bob Chadwick.  Civil Affairs Campaign Planning for Complex Contingency Operations: Getting It 
Right, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 12 Apr 1999, 9-10. 
8 Chadwick, 24. 
 4 
table from the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy and Treasury.  
With the vast array of agency capabilities, resources, and perspectives it is easy to 
understand why interagency collaboration is a challenge. 
The interagency is not a place.  It is a process involving human beings and 
complex organizations with different cultures, different outlooks on 
what’s good for the national interest and the best policy to pursue—all 
driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf.  The process is 
political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is power—personal, 
institutional, or party.  The ‘power game’ involves the push and pull of 
negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives, the hammering out of 
compromises, and the normal human and institutional propensity to resist 
change.9 
With that understanding of the interagency process, one might question how it is ever 
possible for the participants to come to agreement on anything.  James Steinberg, who as 
Deputy National Security Advisor from 1996 until 2000 chaired the Deputies Committee 
of the NSC, addresses that issue: 
What I think we tried to do with the deputies committee, and I know they 
did it with principals, was to say, “Check your institutional hat at the door 
when you come to this meeting.  If we have differences, we have 
differences.  We’ll pass it along.  But at least sit here as a committee of the 
whole of people who all work for the same administration and not just for 
a building, and see whether we can’t find common ground.”  In most 
cases, people found common solutions that they generally felt pretty good 
about.  I don’t think people felt that they agreed for the sake of agreeing.  I 
think that they recognized that there were difficult tradeoffs.  They were 
able to see it from the other person’s perspective and understand why they 
were arguing for it.10 
Nearly thirty U.S. Government agencies are currently operating in complex contingency 
operations overseas.11  Descriptions of the most significant of these agencies, can be 
                                                 
9 Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process: Formed into the 21st Century,” in 
U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 113. 
10 Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler, moderators, The Clinton Administration National Security Council 
Oral History Roundtable, 27 September 2000, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland 
and The Brookings Institution, 23. 
11 David Tucker, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?” 
Parameters, Autumn 2000; available from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/00autumn/tucker.htm; Internet; accessed 21 June 2001. 
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found in Appendix 1.  The three biggest players in the complex contingency interagency 
environment are the NSC, DOS, and DoD.   
The NSC is responsible for coordinating the interagency aspects of a complex 
contingency operation.  A formal meeting of the Clinton NSC was rarely convened, 
instead most Cabinet-level deliberations occurred at Principals Committee (PC) meetings, 
without the presence of the President.  Its main role was to formulate and discuss options.  
Below the Principals Committee was the Deputies Committee (DC), made up of under-
secretary or deputy level administrators representing the principals in the NSC.  The 
Deputies Committee was charged with day-to-day crisis management and preparing 
issues for the Principals Committee.  The Deputies Committee could establish 
Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) staffed at the assistant secretary level.12  Marcella 
explains, “Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul of the process.  
They may be ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional.  They function at a number of 
levels, meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy responses, and 
build consensus across the government for unified action.”13  Standing NSC IWGs in the 
Clinton administration were organized around either geographic regions or functional 
areas, such as Asian Affairs, European Affairs, Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, 
and International Economic Affairs.14  In recent times the Presidency has been more 
‘operational’ than in the past, and the White House staff has been more involved in 
running the day-to-day operations of the government, than ever before.  In this 
environment the NSC has emerged as a powerful organization that sometime appears in 
competition with the Departments of State and Defense.15 
The Department of State is principally responsible for American foreign policy, 
and the Secretary of State is the senior member of the Cabinet.  The State Department is 
also divided into regional and functional bureaus.  Regional bureaus, which do not match 
                                                 
12 Timothy D. Lynch, A Suggested Decision-Making Guide for Use by Interagency Working Groups in 
Developing Policy Recommendations for Complex Contingency Crisis Operations, Army War College, 25 April 1997, 
8-9. 
13 Marcella, 110. 
14 Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 46. 
15 Marcella, 109. 
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either the NSC regional bureaus or the Defense Department’s unified geographic 
commands, are further divided to individual countries at the Desk Officer level.  
Functional bureaus have long been relegated to second-class status within the State 
Department, and their input into national security decision-making has been 
underrepresented.16  Despite the State Department’s statutory responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy, in the Clinton administration it seemed 
to lose its leadership role.   The Department of State works closely with the various 
departments of the United Nations in a variety of operations and missions overseas, is 
responsible for police affairs abroad, and operates embassies around the world.  These 
embassies are themselves interagency forums called country teams where the ambassador 
is responsible for “overseeing and coordinating all activities of the U.S. government 
within his geographic area of responsibility.  The U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) are both previously 
independent agencies that have recently come under the direction of the State 
Department.  USAID is heavily involved in complex contingency operations.  The 
administrator of USAID is designated as the Special Coordinator for International 
Disaster Assistance.  He works through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to deal with the 
immediate response.  DARTs work under the direction of the ambassador.  USAID also 
provides U.S. food donations through direct donations or through a variety of public and 
private agencies.  USIA puts a public face on U.S. foreign policies to audiences abroad 
and tracks public opinion abroad.  USIA provides public affairs officers to embassies, 
and maintains contact with Army psychological operations, although there is little 
coordination.17 
The major players in the Department of Defense include the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and 
the combatant commands.  The Secretary of Defense and the President are the National 
                                                 
16 Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 
277. 
17 Bruce Pirnie, Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination (RAND, 1998), 20-21; 
available from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1026/MR1026.pdf/; Internet; accessed 14 April 
2000. 
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Command Authority (NCA), with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as 
their principal military advisor.  The Joint Staff is responsible for the national military 
strategy.  The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) is responsible for peacetime 
planning and is the military’s representative to the PDD 56 process.  The military 
departments are led by civilian secretaries and through the military chiefs are responsible 
for organizing, equipping, training and supplying forces, but do not have operational 
control over them.  Unified commanders are either regional or functional, U.S. European 
Command or U.S. Transportation Command, for example.  They have operational control 
over forces from all services in their regions of responsibility.  Some unified commanders 
also control international military organizations, for example the Commander in Chief, 
U.S. European Command (CINCEUR) is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible to both the U.S. NCA and NATO’s North Atlantic 
Council (NAC).18   
A side-by-side comparison of the Departments of State and Defense illuminates 
many of the reasons why these agencies find it so difficult to work together.  A recent 
article, “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus”19 captures the cultural differences of 
the two departments in a humorous way.  Common to both departments is a strong sense 
of professionalism, dedication, and competence, but that is where the similarities end. 
Characteristics Department of State Department of Defense 
Organization Decentralized Hierarchical 
Training Programs On-the-Job Structured and Formal 
Doctrine Little Extensive 
Future Perspective Long Term Short Term 
Accountability Less Accountable Highly Accountable 
Individual Culture Independence Discipline 
Values Individual Achievement Teamwork 
World View Grey Black and White 
Focus Flexibility Details 
Problem Solving Informal and Creative Precise and Predictable 
Table 1.   A State-Defense Comparison20 
                                                 
18 Pirnie, 21-23. 
19 “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National 
Security,” available from http://www.pdd56.com/print.cgi; Internet; accessed 29 May 2000. 
20 Mike Harwood, “Field Implementation of Policy,” available from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki/inter-agency/iwa/sld001.htm; Internet; accessed 5 May 2001; “Defense 
is from Mars.” 
 8 
Blending each department’s strengths and niche capabilities, a comprehensive 
operation can be mounted in response to a crisis.  Nevertheless, the Defense-State 
partnership in complex contingency operations can be an “uncomfortable marriage of 
necessity.”   
C. WICKED PROBLEMS 
“Wicked problems” have been around since 1973, when the term was first used to 
characterize new public policy problems that confounded old problem-solving 
techniques.21  Since then, the concept of wicked problems has been applied to both public 
policy making and strategic planning in the business world.  Wicked problems have the 
following four characteristics: 
• The problem is an evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints.  
Indeed, there is no definitive statement of the problem.  You don’t 
understand the problem until you have developed a solution. 
• There are many stakeholders—people who care about or have 
something at stake in how the problem is resolved.  This makes the 
problem solving process fundamentally social.  Getting the right 
answer is not as important as having stakeholders accept whatever 
solution emerges.  
• The constraints on the solution, such as limited resources and political 
ramifications, change over time.  The constraints change, ultimately, 
because we live in a rapidly changing world.  Operationally, they 
change because many are generated by the stakeholders, who come 
and go, change their minds, fail to communicate, or otherwise change 
the rules by which the problem must be solved. 
• Since there is no definitive Problem, there is no definitive Solution.  
The problem-solving process ends when you run out of time, money, 
energy, or some other resource, not when some perfect solution 
emerges.22 
Complex contingency operations can be characterized as wicked problems.  As 
shown in Table 2, complex contingency operations fit the four wicked problems 
characteristics as defined by Conklin and Weil. 
                                                 
21 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences, 1973: 155. 
22 Emphasis added.  E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil, Wicked Problems: Naming the Pain in 
Organizations; available from http://www.mmm.com/meetingnetwork/readingroom/gdss_wicked.html; 
Internet; accessed 22 August 2001. 
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Wicked Problems Complex Contingency Operations 
Evolving set of interlocking issues and 
constraints; no definitive statement of 
the problem 
“Multi-dimensional operations composed 
of such components as 
political/diplomatic, humanitarian, 
intelligence, economic development, and 
security”23 
Many stakeholders 
Interagency environment: NSC, DOS 
(USAID, USIA, OFDA), DoD (OSD, 
JCS, CINC), CIA, DOJ (FBI, DEA, INS, 
ICITAP), USDA, DOC, DOE, OPIC, 
etc…24 
Constraints on the solution, such as limited 
resources and political ramifications, 
change over time 
Agency budgets, political risks, changing 
situation in the field 
No definitive solution; problem-solving 
process ends when you run out of time, 
money, etc… 
Some situations last for years before 
resolved (Bosnia 1991-present), some 
are crisis response operations that last 
for a few months (Hurricane Mitch) 
Table 2.   Wicked Problems and Complex Contingency Operations 
Because the problem cannot be defined and the constraints are constantly changing, 
traditional linear problem solving is insufficient.  In fact, the idea of problem solving 
does not really apply here, because there are no definitive solutions.  Interagency players 
can only hope to cope with complex contingency operations, not solve them.  The process 
described by Presidential Decision Directive 56 is a collaborative, interagency approach 
to cope with the wicked problem of complex contingency operations. 
D. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56 
In response to the U.S. performances in complex contingency operations in 
Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995-1996, President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing 
Complex Contingency Operations in May 1997.  The Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD), which had been in development for nearly two years, drew largely from the 
positive lessons of the U.S. intervention in Haiti.  PDD 56’s purpose is to: 
                                                 
23 The White House, 1997. 
24 When complex contingency operations are examined at the larger international level of analysis, 
they appear to be even more wicked, with vast numbers of stakeholders and the additional constraints that 
they bring with them; however, since this thesis is focused on the impact of PDD 56, the examination of 
complex contingency operations as wicked problems is limited to the USG interagency stakeholders. 
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Institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to 
continue the process of improving the planning and management of 
complex contingency operations.  The PDD is designed to ensure that the 
lessons learned – including proven planning processes and implementation 
mechanisms – will be incorporated into the interagency process on a 
regular basis.  The PDD’s intent is to establish these management 
practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government 
agencies…engaged in complex contingency operations.25 
PDD 56 describes six mechanisms that, when used in concert, are designed to achieve 
U.S. Government (USG) unity of effort when responding to complex contingency 
operations.  The six mechanisms are as follows: 
• Executive Committee (Excom) 
• Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan) 
• Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal 
• After-Action Review (AAR) 
• Training 
• Agency Review and Implementation26 
The Excom, pol-mil plan and interagency rehearsal describe a collaborative interagency 
process, while the AARs, training program, and agency reviews ensure that lessons noted 
become lessons learned and are incorporated into future operations.  
The process of blending niche capabilities from various agencies together into a 
coherent interagency effort increases the efficiency of the government response by 
reducing redundancy and can help to prevent operators in the field from working at cross 
purposes.  PDD 56 can also minimize tasks best suited for civilians from being put on the 
military simply because they are already there.  Interagency coordination through this 
PDD 56 process can be the difference between success and failure in these difficult and 
complex operations.   
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential 
Decision Directive 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex 
Contingency Operations?  Determining the impact of PDD 56 is important for several 
                                                 
25 The White House, 1997. 
26 The White House, 1997. 
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reasons.  First, complex contingency operations are likely to continue to be a challenge 
for the United States.  Army Lieutenant General William G. Carter, III, former Chief of 
Staff for IFOR (the Implementation Force deployed to Bosnia in 1995) said as much at a 
1999 conference at the National Defense University.  “It is clear that the world of the 
next 15-20 years will be one of chronic crisis.  The current increase in peace operations 
is, therefore, not an anomaly.”27  While interventions in large-scale humanitarian crises, 
whether natural or man-made, rarely involve vital American interests, they do involve 
humanitarian interests, and our participation in such operations works to advance 
American values around the world.  Supporting international peace and stability 
operations is one of the fundamental elements of our current national security strategy.28 
Second, if PDD 56 works at a strategic level then it may also apply at three 
different levels of analysis.  First, PDD 56 is designed to coordinate USG interagency 
efforts at the strategic level.  Such coordination is also required at the operational and 
tactical levels.  This becomes somewhat more problematic because many of the agencies 
involved do not have clearly delineated separations at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels like the military.  Currently, interagency coordination at these levels is 
conducted at ad hoc Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC), which have met with 
varied results.  Applying the PDD 56 tools, or something similar, in a more systematic 
function could make these ad hoc mechanisms more successful.  Second, complex 
contingency operations always involve organizations beyond the U.S. Government.  If 
the PDD 56 process works within the U.S. interagency environment, then it may also 
work within the larger international community, which includes, other nations, Non-
Government Organizations such as CARE or Médecins Sans Frontieres, and Inter-
Government Organizations such as the UN, NATO, or the International Committee of the 
Red Cross.  Third, U.S. Government interagency coordination is a problem that 
transcends the context of complex contingency operations.  Today, it is rare that an issue 
of any importance can be dealt with solely by a single government agency.  Most are 
approached in an ad hoc and inefficient way.  If the tools of PDD 56 are deemed useful 
                                                 
27 Beyond Jointness, 1. 
28 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, Washington, D.C., December 
2000, 3-5. 
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for dealing with complex contingency operations, then they might be successfully applied 
in other areas of government management.  It is unlikely that the organization devised by 
the National Security Act of 1947 will be fundamentally changed in the near term.  PDD 
56 may help mitigate the difficulties of coping with many of these cross-departmental 
issues.   
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The impact of PDD 56 will be determined using pre and post case study 
comparison, treating PDD 56 as the intervention.  The pre-PDD 56 case study examines 
the U.S. involvement in the peace accord implementation in Bosnia in 1995-1996, and 
the post-PDD 56 case study examines the U.S. involvement in Kosovo in 1998-1999.  
These cases were selected from a list of complex contingency operations that included 
Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.  Bosnia and Kosovo were 
selected because they were both complex contingency operations that stressed all 
dimensions of a response across many U.S. government agencies.  They were operations 
in which the United States was reluctant to get involved due to potential political 
ramifications, and little progress was made until the United States was willing to act.  In 
both cases the application of force through NATO bombing encouraged parties to agree 
to a peace agreement, which then was implemented through a complex international 
military and civilian organization.  The cases occurred in the same region and over a 
relatively short period of time.  Bosnia is the last complex contingency operation before 
PDD 56 was signed, and Kosovo was the first case in which PDD 56 was thoughtfully 
applied.   
The following six variables will be used to compare the two cases:  
1. Type of Planning – Was planning was functional and “stove-piped” or 
interagency and collaborative? 
2. Depth of Planning – How far down into the organization did the 
planning reach? 
3. Timing of Planning – Was planning advanced, while the crisis was 
developing, or “on-the-fly?” 
4. Decision Process – Was the decision process a top-down process 
involving few people or was it bottom-up with more people tasked to 
lay out options for decision makers? 
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5. Funding – Was sufficient funding allocated before the operation 
began? 
6. Monitoring and Modification – Who is responsible for day-to-day 
operations and oversight as well as adapting the plans to cope with 
changing conditions? 
The comparison of these variables is the primary source for analyzing the impact of PDD 
56.  These variables will be further described in Chapter V.  An examination of 
improvements that have been made to the PDD 56 process will also illuminate the 
continued impact of PDD 56 on the interagency ability to cope with complex contingency 
operations. 
Research for this thesis has relied on both primary and secondary sources.  
Primary sources include PDD white papers, planning documents, speech transcripts, 
briefing transcripts, press releases, after action reports, oral history transcripts, training 
reports, policy briefs, the PDD 56 Handbook, and personal interviews.  Secondary 
sources include articles from scholarly journals, books, studies, and student papers.  PDD 
56 has been a frequent topic of student papers at the various war colleges, because, to the 
military’s delight, PDD 56 imparts a structure to what had previously been an ad hoc 
process. 
G. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter II is the pre-PDD 56 case study of U.S. participation in Bosnia in 1995-
1996.  Chapter III is a more elaborate description of PDD 56.  Chapter IV is the post-
PDD 56 case study of U.S. participation in Kosovo in 1998-1999.  Chapter V, the 
analysis, begins with a comparison of the variables in the two cases, and then reviews 
improvements that have been made to the PDD 56 process since it was implemented.  
Chapter VI concludes with an answer to the thesis question, as well as some 
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II. BOSNIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the summer of 1995, brutal ethnic war had ravaged the former Yugoslavia for 
years.  Cease-fires were repeatedly violated, agreements broken, and there was no end in 
sight.  After campaigning on the Bosnian issue in 1992 Presidential election, the Clinton 
administration proved unable or unwilling to make any significant changes in U.S. policy 
for more than two years.  Weaknesses in the NATO coalition drove a weak American 
policy.  As one senior administration official said at the time,  
We have been putting straws on the back of NATO solidarity over Bosnia 
for the last two years.  We have been pushing them over and over to use 
military force, to the point where we have come to threaten the destruction 
of the transatlantic treaty.  We have decided that we are not going to do 
that anymore.  We are not going to make this a manhood test.  We are not 
going to break NATO over this.29 
Once the administration came to the decision that NATO was more important than an end 
to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, American policy shifted to merely containing 
the conflict to Bosnia and preventing its spread to other Balkan states.  By the beginning 
of 1995, it seemed as if everyone in the Clinton administration had decided that there was 
no solution to what Secretary of State Warren Christopher had characterized as the 
“problem from hell.” 
This case study focuses on events that occurred from May 1995 until March 1996.  
The first section will describe those events and the USG interagency response.  This 
section first describes the situation on the ground in Bosnia in the summer of 1995; 
second, the three plans presented to the President, one each from the National Security 
Advisor, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense; third, the development of 
an implementation plan; and lastly, some of the problems that were experienced on the 
ground in Bosnia.  This chapter then concludes with some of the interagency lessons 
learned from this complex contingency operation. 
                                                 
29 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy  (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000).  Unless otherwise noted, the material for this case study is drawn from 
this source. 
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B. “THE PROBLEM FROM HELL” 
The first few months of 1995 were quiet while a cease-fire remained in place.  
While the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) helped civilian humanitarian 
agencies deliver food and supplies throughout the region, the warring parties used the 
winter cease-fire to smuggle arms, train forces, and prepare for spring offensives.  On 
May 7th renewed fighting broke out, with artillery shelling into Sarajevo – one of six UN 
declared “safe areas,” killing eleven.  The UN failed to react to the violation, overruling a 
request from the UNPROFOR commander for NATO air strikes.  On May 22nd the now 
emboldened Serb forces seized heavy weapons stored near Sarajevo – violating the 
twenty-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone that had been in place for more than a 
year.  The UN gave the Serbs an ultimatum – return the weapons within forty-eight hours 
or face air strikes.  The Serbs did nothing, and NATO destroyed two ammunition 
bunkers.  The Serbs next shelled Tuzla, another UN safe area, this time killing seventy-
one.  NATO responded by attacking six ammunition bunkers.  The Serbs escalated the 
conflict by taking nearly four hundred UN peacekeepers hostage.  Here the role of the 
media took center stage as the television images of UN peacekeepers being held hostage 
was a deep embarrassment for both the UN and, in particular, Britain and France, “great 
powers” who had forces deployed as part of UNPROFOR.  The UN Secretary-General 
called for a “fundamental review of UNPROFOR” and their withdrawal was seriously 
considered.  The potential withdrawal of UNPROFOR threatened NATO unity.  The 
United States was adamantly opposed to its withdrawal, partly because they had pledged 
some 25,000 U.S. troops as part of a NATO contingent to cover UNPROFOR’s safe 
withdrawal if it proved necessary.  The United Nations had proved unable to alter the 
situation on the ground in any significant way, and although a considerable amount of 
work by NGOs was contributing to delivering food and setting up refugee camps, the 
United Nations forces were becoming a bargaining chip for the opposing forces. 
While this controversy raged within NATO, members of Congress were pressing 
for lifting the arms embargo in Bosnia.  This position, unpopular in Europe, would have 
likely led to an unrecoverable rift in the NATO alliance and leave the responsibility for 
Bosnia squarely on the shoulders of the United States, all but guaranteeing the 
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withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. forces to the 
region.  On August 1st the Congress sent the President a bill calling for an end to the arms 
embargo in the event of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.  While the bill fell short of the 
hard-liner position requiring the President to unilaterally lift the embargo, it sent a clear 
message from the Congress that the administration’s current Bosnia policy was 
ineffective and something new was needed.  While all of this was happening, the 1996 
Presidential race began to loom large on the horizon.  It became increasingly important to 
not let an American foreign policy failure in Bosnia become a campaign issue, but by the 
summer of 1995, Bosnia had effectively hijacked U.S. foreign policy.  At one point, 
Anthony Lake, the President’s National Security Advisor wrote to Clinton in a memo 
“that the administration’s weak, muddle-through strategy in Bosnia was becoming a 
cancer on Clinton’s entire foreign policy – spreading and eating away at its credibility….  
I’m really worried that Bosnia will again come to be the definition of American foreign 
policy and obscure all the other things we’ve done.” 
C. A MORE STRATEGIC APPROACH 
In June, President Clinton met with his senior advisors.  Clinton, describing U.S. 
policy toward Bosnia said, “We’ve got no clear mission, no one’s in control of events.”  
Vice President Gore added, “It’s the issue from hell.  The Europeans are self-
delusional….  The need for us to protect and preserve the alliance is driving our policy.  
[And] it is driving us into a brick wall with Congress.”  Clinton’s obvious frustration 
gave Anthony Lake an opening.  Lake and his Bosnia aides on the NSC staff had wanted 
to take a more strategic approach to Bosnia as opposed to the immediate crisis 
management that had plagued U.S. policy for more than two years.  The key problem, as 
he saw it, was to get everyone to the table in order to end the fighting.  First he had to get 
policy consensus with the U.S. government, and for this he needed Secretaries 
Christopher and Perry to agree on a forward-leaning and assertive posture.  Next, he 
could get the allies onboard, and then finally the warring parties.   
Lake began a series of NSC staff meetings on June 24th to develop a new Bosnia 
strategy.  He described the purpose of the meeting to his staff as “a blue skies discussion 
on what longer-term strategy would be.”  He told his staff to “think from the end 
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backward.”  The strategy that came from these meetings became known as the Endgame 
Strategy.  Meanwhile, American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright 
had made her position on Bosnia known through a one and a half page memo she wrote 
for the President entitled “Elements of a New Strategy” where she strongly advocated a 
new approach toward Bosnia.  The State Department was working on its own policy 
review during June as well.  Their policy was based on the idea that “the United States 
was standing on the edge of two waterfalls and the trick was to make sure that it went 
down the right one.” 
In July, Anthony Lake told the President that he had been working on a new 
strategy for dealing with the Bosnian situation and gave the President a draft of his 
Endgame Strategy.  Clinton liked it, and Lake told him that he was convening a meeting 
with the other principals to discuss long-term strategy and that he planned to present the 
Endgame Strategy to them.  He suggested that the President drop by the meeting to 
emphasize his desire for a long-term solution.  On July 17th Anthony Lake, Secretary of 
State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, Ambassador Albright, General 
Shalikashvili, and Sandy Berger, Lake’s deputy, met to discuss Bosnia.  Lake presented 
his strategy plan to the group, and as he expected, Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvili 
showed little interest in what they saw as yet another policy review.  They were more 
interested in “immediate tactical considerations” continuing the reactive policy that had 
plagued the administration.  At that point the President joined the meeting as Lake had 
arranged.  Clinton told the group, “I don’t like where we are now.  This policy is doing 
enormous damage to the United States and to our standing in the world.  We look weak.  
It can only get worse down the road.  The only time we’ve ever made any progress is 
when we geared up NATO to pose a real threat to the Serbs.”  He then called on his 
advisors to come up with something new. 
D. THREE OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT 
For two weeks an interagency group at the deputies level met daily to prepare 
strategy options to present to the President.  In early August Anthony Lake submitted 
four strategy papers to the President.  The first paper presented was basically a rewrite of 
Ambassador Albright’s “Elements of a New Strategy” memo.  Her paper gave supporting 
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rationale and strategic justification for much of Anthony Lake’s Endgame strategy.  She 
wrote that U.S. foreign policy credibility was inextricably linked to the future of Bosnia, 
therefore the United States must take the lead in the issue.  The question was no longer if 
UNPROFOR was going to withdrawal, but only when.  As long as U.S. troops were 
committed to being deployed to Bosnia, it should be on U.S. terms, not at the beck and 
call of allies.  Lastly, she wrote that every time the U.S. and NATO seriously threatened 
the use of force, the Serbs gave in; therefore, any U.S. plan should be based on using 
military pressure to convince the Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement. 
The second paper presented to the President was the first real strategy option, 
Lake’s Endgame Strategy.  The President had already seen this option and had liked it.  
Lake’s plan called for the preservation of a viable Bosnian state along the 51/49 split first 
suggested in the Contact Group’s plan.  Lake felt a political settlement or balance of 
power on the ground was critical to getting a working agreement.  In order to support this 
the United States should be willing and prepared to support the Bosnians if necessary to 
get the Serbs to negotiate.  Lake was clear that U.S. support for the Bosnians should be 
based on their willingness to negotiate for a settlement.  The United States would not help 
them settle their differences militarily.  If a political settlement was unobtainable, then 
Lake’s plan called for the U.S. asking for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.  Along with 
the UN withdrawal, the arms embargo should be lifted, multilaterally if possible, but 
unilaterally if necessary.  The United States would provide arms and training for Bosnian 
forces, enforce no-fly zones including preemptive attacks on air defense systems, and 
conduct air strikes on defend “safe areas” for up to a year.  The last part of Lake’s plan 
would be for the United States to encourage a successor to UNPROFOR to be made of 
forces from moderate Muslim states. 
The next strategy presented to the President was the Secretary Christopher’s plan 
for renewed negotiation.  This plan grew from the “waterfall memo” which posited that 
the withdrawal of UNPROFOR was the wrong waterfall to go down.  State’s plan 
emphasized the risk to US troops if they were deployed to cover UNPROFOR’s 
withdrawal and proposed a summit with Serbian, Croat, and Bosnian presidents with the 
Contact Group.  The purpose of this summit was so that the three presidents could 
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officially recognize each other and set the groundwork and principles for a future summit 
to negotiate a peace settlement.  Secretary Christopher also wanted to offer sanctions 
relief to Milosovic in an effort to convince him to get the Bosnian Serbs to the 
negotiation table (this represented a significant shift in U.S. policy away from refusing to 
negotiate with Karadzic and Mladic, both indicted war criminals, but finally recognized 
that without the Bosnian Serbs agreement, peace could not be guaranteed).  Lastly, in the 
event of UNPROFOR’s withdrawal, the United States would lift the embargo and 
provide arms to the Bosnians and conduct any training outside of Bosnia.  Secretary 
Christopher’s plan was against U.S. air strikes of any kind, emphasizing the importance 
of not becoming directly militarily involved in fighting in Bosnia. 
The final plan presented to the President was from the Department of Defense.  
Secretary Perry’s plan called for the United States to accept the partition of Bosnia along 
the existing confrontation line, although some consolidation of the map might be allowed 
to make the border more easily defended.  Under this plan Serb areas in Bosnia would 
remain autonomous from the central Bosnian government and in time could vote to join 
Serbia.  This represented a major departure from U.S. policy that had been unwaveringly 
against partition, and would give the Serbs roughly seventy percent of the partition.  The 
plan also called for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a permanent 
cessation of hostilities.  The plan called for the demilitarization of Sarajevo.  The United 
States and Europe would then provide considerable economic assistance to support the 
smaller states that remain.  See Table 3 for a comparison of the three strategies presented 
to the President. 





What is the US role? Leader Mediator Financial Assistance 








How long will it take to implement? About One Year Long Term Short Term 
What is the level of US military 
involvement? High Medium None 
What is the level of risk to US 
credibility? High Medium Low 
Does it satisfy the President’s desire for 
something new? Yes No Yes 
Table 3.   Three Bosnia Strategy Options 
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On August 7th, the principals met with the President to discuss the four plans.  He 
began the meeting by stating that muddling through was no longer an option.  First, a 
“last-ditch” diplomatic effort with NATO resolve was in order.  U.S. leadership was 
critical for a chance at success, but even with the United States taking a leading role, the 
effort might fail.  Second, if this diplomatic effort does fail, the United States should ask 
for the immediate withdrawal of UNPROFOR, lift the embargo, and execute a post-
UNPROFOR strategy.  This post-UNPROFOR strategy is where the President felt that 
there were still some questions to be answered.  Lake summarized the four plans for the 
group and the principals were each given a chance to offer their perspectives.  As 
Albright and Lake’s plans were not exclusive, the President began the discussion by 
saying that he liked the gist of the Albright paper and the specifics of Lake’s strategy.  
Clinton said, “We’ve got to exhaust every alternative, roll every die, take risks.”  He felt 
that if the situation were not resolved quickly, it would be “dropped in during the middle 
of the campaign.”  The principals further discussed the details of how the diplomatic plan 
should be implemented and what should happen if it failed.  The next evening the 
President reconvened the group and told them that he had chosen Lake’s Endgame 
Strategy.  The group then worked through the talking points that Lake would present to 
the allies. 
E. STRATEGY SELECTION 
The plan that Lake briefed the allied leaders showed the best aspects of all four 
plans presented to the President in early August, but clearly the President preferred 
Anthony Lake’s Endgame Strategy.  Here the risks were the greatest for the United States 
because by taking the lead in the effort they also would take full responsibility for failure.  
However, in the realities of the international system, and after the failure of the UN 
effort, and the inability of the allies of developing a plan that everyone agreed with, 
President Clinton decided to roll the dice.  Lake’s plan, if successful, would also prevent 
Bosnia from becoming an issue in the upcoming Presidential election.  Thus the timeline 
was an important consideration in deciding which plan would be implemented.  
Additionally, the manner in which Lake presented his plan to the President before the 
other members of the cabinet probably had a considerable affect on the President’s final 
decision. 
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When Lake met with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, 
Spain, and Turkey, he made the same presentation to each.  Each meeting began with 
emphasizing that this is what the President has already decided to do.  He asked each of 
the allies for support, but wanted them to understand that the President would act with or 
without their help.  The next part of Lake’s presentation described the plan for a 
diplomatic solution: 
• A comprehensive peace settlement based on the core principles of the 
Contact group plan, including a united Bosnia; 
• Three-way recognition between Croatia, Bosnia, and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia; 
• Consideration of changes in the Contact Group map to take account of 
recent territorial changes and to ensure viable and defensible borders; 
• A framework for the long-term constitutional arrangements of a united 
Bosnia, including the possible scope of the “parallel special relationship” 
of the two entities with Croatia and Serbia; 
• Sanctions relief for Yugoslavia, with the suspension of sanctions once an 
agreement had been signed and complete lifting of sanctions once the 
agreement had been implemented; 
• A plan to resolve the situation in eastern Slavonia, a part of Croatia 
bordering Serbia; and 
• A comprehensive plan for regional economic integration, to be assisted 
through an international “mini-Marshall” plan. 
The last part of Lake’s presentation to the allies described the U.S. plan for dealing with a 
diplomatic failure and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR:  
• Seek to end the arms embargo multilaterally, through a vote by the UN 
Security Council; 
• Provide arms, training, and support to the Bosnians (whether the arms 
embargo was lifted or not) in order to assist in establishing a balance of 
power on the ground; 
• Enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air strikes for a nine-month transition 
period in case the Bosnian Serbs attacked; and 
• Encourage the presence of a multinational force to assist the Bosnians in 
defending their territory. 
Lake anticipated resistance from each of the allied leaders, but generally the 
meetings were “a piece of cake.”  The allies were not necessarily pleased with all aspects 
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of the American plan, but were nonetheless glad that someone was willing to take the 
lead.  In typical American fashion when Lake was “asked along the way how he was 
going to get the allies on board, Lake had said that the United States was the ‘big dog’ 
that others followed.  After each successful stop in a European capital, the lake team 
concluded that ‘the big dog had barked.’”  
Once Lake had the allies on board, the next step was to conduct the U.S. 
diplomatic shuttle.  Richard Holbrooke was chosen to lead the effort, in part because he 
“possessed the kind of ego, drive, aggressiveness, and bluster necessary to negotiate with 
intransigent parties such as those in Bosnia.”  While Holbrooke and his team traveled 
throughout the Balkans, policymakers in Washington worked through the details of an 
acceptable peace agreement.  Where the principals had worked through the plans for a 
new policy, the plans for implementation were left to the Deputies. 
F. AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Good timing is everything.  While the Deputies in Washington were working 
toward an implementation plan for the, yet to be achieved, peace settlement, the 
fundamental strategic landscape in Bosnia shifted.  During the summer the Croatian 
forces had been mounting a successful offensive aimed at recovering territory in Croatia 
that had been held by Serbs since 1992.  NATO bombing of Serb targets resumed on 
September 5th, and by September 9th the Croatian forces, fighting alongside Bosnian 
Muslim and Bosnian-Croat troops, had entered Bosnia.  The military tide had turned, and 
the Serbs were on their heels.  By September 13th, when Richard Holbrooke arrived in 
Belgrade, the Serbs were ready to talk.  In Late August, Milosovic called the Bosnia Serb 
leadership to Belgrade and worked out an agreement by which Milosovic would be 
responsible for all Serbs during peace negotiations.  This agreement, called the “Patriarch 
Paper” would bind Bosnian Serbs to any agreement that Milosovic might sign, effectively 
gaining their proxy for the upcoming diplomatic negotiations that would lead to the 
Dayton Agreement.  These three factors, the Croat offensive, renewed NATO air strikes, 
and the Bosnian Serb acceptance of Milosovic’s role in the negotiations created a new 
environment where peace talks could proceed.   
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In October 1995, the Principals Committee established an Excom whose purpose 
was to support Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiations and write a political-military plan 
for the implementation of a peace agreement.  But a peace agreement did not exist yet, 
and its formulation was difficult and not certain until the final day of the talks at Dayton.  
Due to the difficult nature of the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke did not work with 
the Excom, but only dealt with the Principals Committee, and therefore the Excom 
proved ineffective.30  While Holbrooke was getting the parties working toward an 
agreement, the Deputies in Washington began working on the implementation plan.  The 
Deputies Committee consisted of Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor and 
chairman of the committee, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, Policy Planning Chief James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense John White, Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocoobe, Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Owens, Deputy Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency George Tenet, Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, representatives of the 
Office of the Vice President, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Treasury Department, 
Agency for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget.  
Their meetings addressed three key issues: the mandate and mission of the 
Implementation Force (IFOR), the exit strategy and deadline, and the civilian 
implementation effort. 
1. IFOR Mandate 
The mandate developed for IFOR was to help enforce an agreed upon peace 
settlement, but should that fail, IFOR would help the Bosnians.  The key parts of the 
mandate include a unified NATO command with no U.N. involvement, clear and robust 
rules of engagement, and the mission would be focused on the military aspects of the 
peace agreement – marking boundaries, maintaining the separation of forces, and 
cessation of hostilities.  The NATO plan developed in Brussels and approved by North 
Atlantic Council in October, reflected these key issues the Deputies agreed upon in 
Washington.  By the end of October there were two, seemingly irreconcilable, positions 
on the breadth of the IFOR mandate.  The minimalists, led by Anthony Lake, felt the 
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military’s mandate should be narrow, limited to the specifically military aspects of the 
agreement.  The maximalists, led by Richard Holbrooke, pushed for a broad mandate that 
would assign to the military such tasks as providing security during elections, arresting 
war criminals, protecting refugees returning to their homes, and responding to human 
rights violations.  This fundamental disagreement came to a head just before the 
negotiations in Dayton began.  General Shalikashvili eventually devised the middle 
ground mandate that could be accepted by both the minimalists and maximalists.  IFOR 
would be give the authority to assist in the civilian aspects of the implementation, but 
would only be required to carry out the military aspects.  This gave the commander of the 
force on the ground broad latitude to take on civil missions when the resources are 
available. 
2. Exit Strategy 
The overarching question in Washington was how long U.S. forces would be on 
the ground in Bosnia.  Both political limitations and military realities led the Deputies 
Committee to agree to a one-year operation.  The timeline agreed to in the Dayton 
Accords called for all military aspects of the agreement to be fulfilled in 120 days.  The 
basic goal of U.S. policy was to achieve a balance of power in Bosnia and that would 
then secure peace and stability.  At worst case, the administration felt that within a year 
they could build up Bosnian forces to even the military balance.  Lastly, it was believed 
that a balance of power and a year without fighting would create a momentum for peace 
that would last after the withdrawal of NATO forces.  This deadline never took into 
account the wider goals of the Dayton Accords but it kept Bosnia from becoming a major 
issue in the 1996 U.S. Presidential election. 
3. Civilian Implementation 
The last part of the planning effort in Washington was the civilian implementation 
effort.  Once it became clear that an American would not be appointed as the High 
Representative (HiRep), the individual responsible for the civilian implementation, the 
effort in Washington focused on undermining the power of the office of the HiRep.  
Pauline Neville-Jones, the British negotiator at Dayton, said, “The U.S. negotiating tactic 
seemed to be to concede to this office [HiRep] as little authority as possible, either over 
the agencies engaged in civilian implementation or in relation to the military 
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commander.”  She described the HiRep as “not fully answerable to any body of 
uncontested international authority and operates in uncomfortable and unconvincing 
limbo.”  The HiRep was appointed by and overseen by the unwieldy Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC), consisting of representatives from the G7 plus Russia.  
The civilian implementation organization can be seen in Figure 1.  This arrangement 
proved to create a stark separation between the clear and straightforward NATO 
command arrangements of the IFOR and the civilian implementation effort. 
 
Figure 1.   Civilian Implementation Organization31 
 
4. The Dayton Accords 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), more widely known as 
the Dayton Accords, was initialed on November 21, and formally signed in Paris on 
December 14, 1995.  Under the agreement the parties agreed to the following: respect 
each other’s sovereignty, settle disputes peaceably, respect human rights and the rights of 
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refugees and displaced persons, and cooperate with all entities implementing the eleven 
annexes of the peace operations.32 
Annex 1-A is the military annex of the agreement and includes a cease-fire, 
withdrawal of forces, and cantonment of heavy weapons.  IFOR was deployed to monitor 
compliance with Annex 1-A only and was authorized to use force, if necessary.  
Information on mines, military personnel, and weapons was to be reported to the IFOR 
commander through the Joint Military Commission.  Lastly, a transfer of military 
personnel and civilians was to be carried out under the auspices of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).33  Annex 1-B focuses on regional stability, and 
called for negotiations between the parties to be conducted under the guidance of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of 
developing confidence-building measures.  Annex 1-B also directed the OSCE to 
organize a regional military balance by managing negotiations to limit military forces and 
equipment.34 
Annex 2 set an Inter-Entity Boundary Line and accounted for the future status of 
Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Brcko.  Annex 3 addresses the issue of elections and requested 
OSCE supervise the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections.  Annex 4 set forth 
a new constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The constitution accounted for human 
rights, free movement of people, goods, capital, and services.  It describes the structure of 
the presidency, legislature, judiciary, central bank, and monetary system.  Annex 5 
describes a system of binding arbitration for disputes between the Federation and the 
Bosnian Serb Republic – the two entities created in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Annex 6 
guarantees human rights and established a Commission on Human Rights.  OSCE and 
UN human rights agencies were granted full access to monitor human rights in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Annex 7 established a Commission for Displaced Persons and 
Refugees to ensure their safe return to their homes and compensation for lost property.  In 
Annex 7 the parties agreed to help the ICRC find all missing persons.  Annex 8 
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established a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.  Annex 9 established a 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation to operate and maintain roads, 
railways, and port facilities and a Commission on Public Corporations to establish other 
public utilities and postal service.  Annex 10 requested a High Representative (HiRep) to 
coordinate all the civilian aspects of the peace agreement including humanitarian aid, 
economic reconstruction, human rights, and elections.  The HiRep has no authority over 
IFOR or the military aspects of the agreement.  Lastly, Annex 11 requested the UN 
establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to train and monitor law enforcement 
personnel.35 
G. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
IFOR deployed on December 29, 1995.  From November 1995 until February 
1996, the Excom proposed several plans for the civilian implementation, but the 
Principals Committee did not approve any of them.  This inability to develop a plan 
reflected a fracture in the administration that went all the way to the cabinet.  The main 
issue of contention continued to be how far IFOR would go to support the civilian 
implementation.  This policy debate which, was not resolved for more than two years 
after the deployment of IFOR, made any interagency effort fractured.  Due to these 
disagreements at the top, the Excom was wholly ineffective.36  
The policy debate that plagued the Bosnia operations came from the fundamental 
question, did the U.S. policy intend to end a war or build a peace?  Anthony Lake in his 
minimalist view felt that  
assigning too large a role to the international community for rebuilding 
war-torn societies would create “unreasonable expectation [on the part of 
the parties] that the hard work will be done for them not by them.”  The 
role of the international community should be limited to providing 
“governments the breathing room they must have to tackle their own 
problems.” 
Initially, the minimalists won the battle of expectations in Washington, but as the 
international military efforts met with success, the euphoria at ending a war has led to the 
realization that in order prevent its reoccurrence the focus must shift to building a peace.  
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IFOR could help guarantee an end to the fighting, but it would take a successful civilian 
implementation effort to build a lasting peace. However, 
There was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no 
means by which the military and civilian implementation plans and 
activities were reconciled and coordinated.  The integration that did occur 
was primarily at the operational level – in Bosnia itself – and occurred as a 
result of ad hoc arrangements between the commander of IFOR/SFOR and 
the High Representative.37   
In March 1996 the Deputies Committee, working from the draft plans developed 
by the Excom, began meeting weekly to address the key issues of the civilian 
implementation—police, elections, refugees, and economic reconstruction.  Over several 
months a plan was developed which eventually helped get the civilian implementation on 
course.  IFOR’s mission lasted only one year, as promised to the American people, but 
was replaced with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) – basically a change in name 
only.  By March 1997 it was still behind schedule and Ambassador Robert Gelbard led 
another planning effort to energize the process.  This plan was approved up the American 
channels through the Deputies Committee, Principals Committee and the President, and 
was used as a roadmap for the following year.38   
At the end of SFOR’s initial 18-month commitment, two and a half years after the 
first IFOR troops entered Bosnia, President Clinton finally publicly declared what many 
had already guessed.   
President Clinton announced that the United States would remain 
militarily engaged alongside its NATO allies for as long as it would take 
for peace to become self-sustaining.  There would be no more deadlines, 
only clear benchmarks to measure progress in meeting the goal of a lasting 
peace in Bosnia.  These benchmarks included a durable cease-fire, 
reconfiguring of police forces, effective judicial and election reform, free 
market reform, return of displace persons, and cooperation with the war 
crimes tribunal. 
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H. LESSONS FROM BOSNIA 
Lessons from Bosnia 
The Bosnia-Herzogovina After Action Review noted that the lack of a coherent 
planning process and the ad hoc arrangements were a “root cause” underlying many of 
the problems that occurred in the implementation and limited the unity of effort.39  The 
stove-piped nature of the agreement and implementation organization should have sent 
warning signals that a successful conclusion to this complex contingency operation is 
likely to be elusive.  Other lessons to be learned from the Bosnia operation include the 
following: 
1. The NSC needs strengthening to perform its statutory role in 
developing strategy. 
2. The interagency process needs strengthening: It breaks down too 
easily when agencies take conflicting positions or an agency carries its 
internal conflicts into the interagency process. 
3. Planning is necessary: absent a plan, departmental concerns will 
dominate and these may drive policy in contradictory directions. 
4. Keeping military separate from civilian implementation of the same 
agreement is counterproductive; insulating the military from failure 
does not constitute success. 
5. Civilian-military coordination should occur at all levels.40 
The failure of interagency planning and coordination for Bosnia suggested the 
need for a formal doctrine, like PDD 56, mandating interagency coordination in complex 
contingency operations. 
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III.   PDD 56: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY ON 
MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Good organization doesn’t guarantee success, but bad organization 
guarantees failure. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower41 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In May 1997, President Clinton signed PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s 
Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.  Its intent was to capitalize on the 
positive lessons learned and avoid some of the problems that had plagued previous 
complex contingency operations.  To fully understand how PDD 56 was developed, it is 
important to explore how the U.S. government responded to operations before Bosnia, in 
both Somalia and Haiti.  The first half of this chapter describes the background to PDD 
56, including lessons from operations in Somalia and Haiti, and a description of the pilot 
interagency training program.  The second half of this chapter summarizes the PDD 56 
mechanisms for interagency management of complex contingency operations. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Somalia 
In late 1992 President George Bush decided that the United States would respond 
to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.  From November 1992 until January 1993, the State 
Department chaired an interagency working group on Somalia.  This group, the Somalia 
Task Force, monitored and managed the U.S. involvement in Somalia through the 
beginning of the operation.  When it disbanded in January 1993, high-level interagency 
coordination and oversight ended, leaving no plan to integrate the efforts of the various 
agencies deployed to Somalia – either amongst themselves or within the larger 
international presence.  Within months the UN Security Council expanded the mission 
objectives, and U.S. troops began offensive operations – a significant departure from 
security operations to protect food distribution.42 
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After 18 U.S. Soldiers were killed in October 1993, the operation came under 
intense scrutiny.  Ambassador Robert Oakley and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Frank Wisner requested an interagency organization to manage the U.S. operation in 
Somalia.  On November 1st an Executive Committee was chartered by the Deputies 
Committee of the NSC “to act as a high-level interagency committee to coordinate 
Somalia policy and achieve personal (at the Assistant Secretary level) accountability for 
actions of the various agencies.”  It was co-chaired by Dick Clarke from the NSC and 
James Dobbins from State.43  It was the first Excom of the Clinton administration, but it 
was a case of too little, too late.  The U.S. withdrew from Somalia in March 1994. 
Many of the lessons from the American experience in Somalia point to issues that 
stem from the absence of interagency management in Washington.  Lessons from 
Somalia include the following: 
• Clear statement of a feasible mission, starting with the U.S. government’s 
own statement, is fundamental to success. 
• Unity of command, starting with U.S. forces, is as important in complex 
contingency operations as it is in war. 
• Military forces and relief agencies are highly disparate in culture, but they 
will collaborate willingly if provided liaison, preferably through a well-
supported CMOC [Civil Military Operations Center]. 
• In the absence of reliable government, no clear dividing line exists 
between military operations and law enforcement. 
• The credibility of newly established police forces may depend critically on 
military support in emergency situations. 
• Developing new police forces demands long-term effort and should not be 
considered a quick exit strategy.44 
Many of these lessons would be learned again in future complex contingency 
operations, but the U.S. experience in Somalia positively affected the conduct of the next 
complex contingency operation that the U.S. chose to respond—Haiti. 
2. Haiti 
Haiti is generally upheld as an example of a successful complex contingency 
operation.  PDD 56 codified the interagency process as it unfolded in Haiti.  Operation 
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Uphold Democracy, which was executed in September 1994 and turned over to the 
United Nations in March 1995, was unique in several ways.  First, it involved few groups 
outside the U.S. government.  Canada and several Caribbean nations assisted in the 
operation, and the UN was involved from the beginning, but the preponderance of the 
resources were American and therefore decisions were made by Washington.45  American 
planners were intent on a smooth transition of responsibility from the U.S. to the UN, so 
the UN was on the ground in Haiti from day one.  Additionally, the U.S. did not want to 
get bogged down in a longer-term operation, so planners determined in advance 
objectives that would have to be achieved before the transition and focused on those.  
Haiti was unique in the amount of time available for advance planning.  The Defense 
Department began planning for Haiti in October 1993, nearly a year before it was 
executed.46 
From January to March 1994, the Panama and Somalia after action reports were 
circulating around the Department of Defense.  Recognizing the role poor interagency 
planning played in the American failure in Somalia, Secretary of Defense Perry directed 
the start of interagency planning.47  However, interagency planning was difficult within 
the ongoing policy debate – diplomatic means was the preferred tool for restoring the 
democratically elected president of Haiti, but the NSC was pushing for the use of force.  
It was not until the President decided to consider the use of force in May that interagency 
coordination could begin.  Still, due to security concerns the military planning remained 
isolated from civilian planning, despite the recognition that there were issues that needed 
to be coordinated.  In June, the President was briefed on the military operation, which 
was estimated to last one week.  President Clinton asked the assembled Principals 
Committee, “What happens in the second week?”  No one could answer the question, and 
it was clear that a comprehensive plan had to be drafted.  This plan became known as a 
political-military plan.48  Interagency planning for Haiti was assigned to an Excom, 
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which was staffed at the Assistant Secretary level, chaired by the NSC, and reported to 
the Deputies Committee.  The Haiti Excom was chaired by Dick Clarke from the NSC, 
and Ambassador James Dobbins was the State Department’s Special Haiti Coordinator, 
both of whom had been co-chairs of the Somalia Excom. 
The chief planner at USACOM, Marine Major General Michael Byron had been 
forwarding a series of questions to the Defense Department’s Haiti Task Force for 
months.  He requested planning guidance for issues that were related to post-intervention 
civilian functions.  These issues would affect the conduct of the military operation and 
had to be resolved.  The DoD Haiti Task Force had compiled General Byron’s questions 
into a matrix of issues organized by functional areas.  This matrix provided the basis for 
the Excom’s pol-mil plan.  Dick Clarke, chairman of the Excom, assigned members to 
functional areas of the plan, not just as representatives of their own agency’s plans.  Each 
member was responsible for integrating actions across government agencies for their part 
of the plan.  In August 1994, the first of two interagency rehearsals was held.  In this 
rehearsal, each Excom member briefed their functional areas of the pol-mil plan.  Gaps 
were revealed and the plan was revised.  The second interagency rehearsal was briefed to 
the Deputies Committee.49 
While interagency coordination was taking place at the strategic level, the 
interagency effort did not translate to the operational level.  The operational planning was 
kept compartmentalized for fear of security leaks.  The military created an “OPLAN A” 
which was the plan for the forced entry into Haiti.  The civilian planners created an 
“OPLAN B” which was the plan if the U.S. was invited into Haiti.  The idea was that the 
United States would either execute plan B or they would execute plan A then plan B, 
depending on whether it would be a forced entry or not.50  Consequently operational 
planning was parallel and not synchronized.51  The first interagency meeting at the 
operational level occurred one week before the operation was set to being and it revealed 
significant coordination problems.  “One senior player noted: ‘We tried to do the 
interagency coordination on September 12, but it was a disaster.’  There were too many 
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people for real candor.  ‘People just recited what they were doing.’  A senior military 
officer expressed alarm, reportedly observing, ‘This is the kind of planning that gets 
people killed.’”52  With the strategic coordination not translating to the operational level, 
and the operational coordination not really starting until the week before the operation 
began, the real interagency coordination took place in Haiti at the tactical level, as the 
operation was unfolding.  “In the end, as usual, the absence of detailed operational 
coordination and planning was in many respects offset on the ground by the drive and 
initiative of operators working in harm’s way.”53   
Despite the problems encountered in the U.S. operation in Haiti, it is largely 
considered a success within the framework that it accomplished the goals that the U.S. 
government set out to achieve.54  But even the most successful operation has useful 
lessons that must be learned.  An interagency after action review took place at the 
National Defense University’s Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) on 
May 24, 1995.  The AAR brought together senior civilian and military participants from 
the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice, USAID, Coast Guard, as well as analysts, 
academics, and a representative from a private voluntary organization.  The AAR looked 
at four phases of the Haiti operation: “the planning phase, the military operation itself, the 
transition to civilian control, and the transfer to UN responsibility.  In each phase, the 
participants assessed decision processes and activities taking place at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical planning level and within military, civilian, and 
nongovernmental organizations.”55  Workshop participants agreed on several interagency 
political-military lessons learned. 
• Interagency planning doctrine for complex emergencies is needed. 
• Planning must compensate for organizational and operational differences 
between civilian and military organizations. 
                                                 
52 Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., Interangency and Political-Military Dimensions 
of Peace Operations: Haiti ~ A Case Study (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 32-33. 
53 Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, “Interagency Operations Centers: An 
Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” Parameters, Winter 1998; available from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98winter/moore.htm; Internet; accessed 17 March 2001. 
54 The goals of Haiti operation described by Hayes and Wheatly, were limited to the decapitation of 
the military dictatorship, the restoration of the elected President of Haiti, and the transition of the operation 
to UN control in six months.   
55 Hayes and Wheatley, 4-5. 
 36 
• Agreement on interagency command and control arrangements is needed. 
• Agreement is needed on operational concepts for OOTW. 
• Interagency C2 war games can help to work out interagency differences, 
expose agencies to each other.56 
Most of these lessons formed the basis for PDD 56, which is a doctrine for complex 
emergencies, compensates for organizational differences, accounts for strategic level 
oversight, and requires a training program of war games to help work out interagency 
differences and expose the agencies to each other. 
3. A Pilot Training Program 
Dick Clarke, Senior Director for Global Affairs at the NSC, convened an 
interagency meeting on September 15, 1995, and unveiled an interagency training 
program.  Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements 
and Ambassador Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military 
Affairs, along with leaders in the Joint Staff, USACOM, DoD, DoS, and DOJ, as well as 
leaders from several other agencies who had been involved in Somalia, Haiti, or both, 
came together to identify the most important lessons from these two complex 
contingency operations.  Many of the same personnel had been involved in both Somalia 
and Haiti, and it was precisely this continuity that helped lessons transcend from one 
operation to the next.   
The impetus for a training program came from a desire that their hard-earned 
expertise and lessons learned not be lost when personnel moved on to different 
responsibilities.  Training would institutionalize the lessons learned from past operations 
to ensure that they would be applied in the next operation.  The DoD was to be 
responsible for the development of this three phase pilot training program.57  The first 
phase of the training program occurred in September and October 1995 where lessons 
learned were incorporated into a pol-mil plan template.  The second phase of the exercise 
in November and December 1995 included the development of a pol-mil plan and 
rehearsal brief for an Excom.  A third phase in February 1996 developed a pol-mil plan 
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for a simulated operation in Eastern Zaire.  Based on the participant consensus that the 
training was useful, an additional training session was scheduled for December 1996.58 
An important conclusion that came out of this pilot training program was that it 
would take more than training to get agencies to use the coordination and planning tools 
that had been useful in the Haiti operation.  From this it was decided that a Presidential 
Decision Directive was needed to institutionalize these lessons learned.  In February 
1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Michele Flournoy and Acting 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance 
Len Hawley, as well as their staffs began work on the document that would become PDD 
56.59  
In December 1996, another interagency training session attended by action 
officers, office directors, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries further validated the training 
program that would be mandated in PDD 56.  The participants formed an Excom, wrote a 
pol-mil plan, and conducted a rehearsal.  Then in April 1997, while PDD 56 was in its 
final draft form, representatives from U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) attended an 
interagency training session at NDU.  They wanted to know if the pol-mil plans being 
developed in the interagency training could be linked to their annual theater-level 
exercise called Tempo Brave.  In 1997, Tempo Brave was a simulation of the collapse of 
the government in Burma and the following humanitarian crisis.  To see if it would work, 
PACOM planners and NDU contractors worked together to draft a 27-page pol-mil plan 
based on the template that was being developed by the NSC for PDD 56.   
When Tempo Brave began in July, it was quickly determined that the pol-mil plan 
that had been developed would not work.  It had provided detailed guidance at the 
strategic and operational level, and did not allow the flexibility that was critical for an 
operational commander.   
Tempo Brave demonstrated that the implementation of PDD 56 required 
sufficient flexibility to be useful across the spectrum of complex 
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contingency operations, including unanticipated crises.  Tempo Brave also 
demonstrated that the utility of a stand-alone political-military plan is 
limited when divorced from the dynamic oversight mechanism of the 
Executive Committee.  The Executive Committee plays a critical role in 
adapting the plan as a complex contingency operation unfolds.  Finally, 
Tempo Brave demonstrated that PDD 56 political-military plans must 
remain at the strategic level to be useful at the operational level….  A truly 
strategic plan could have remained useful as a framework for operational 
planning for crisis action.60 
These were valuable lessons and Tempo Brave showed that with some improvements, the 
interagency training in Washington could be linked to CINC exercises around the world. 
C. PDD 56 OVERVIEW 
The purpose is PDD 56 is to “achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government 
agencies.”  To accomplish this aim, PDD 56 describes six mechanisms that when used in 
concert help to: 
• Identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government 
agencies in a U.S. Government response; 
• Develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the 
loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction; 
• Accelerate planning implementation of the civilian aspects of the 
operation; intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements 
early on; 
• Integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) 
at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms 
at the operational level; and 
• Rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious 
implementation of decisions.61 
PDD 56 goals for the interagency process are broad and include: “gaining a 
complete situation assessment; formulating integrated United States Government (USG) 
policy guidance; making agency planning activities transparent to other agencies; 
increasing individual accountability for implementation of assigned agency 
responsibilities; and anticipating and keeping pace with events during operations.”  The 
six PDD 56 mechanisms are as follows: an Executive Committee, a Political-Military 
Implementation Plan, and Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal, an After Action Review, 
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an Interagency Training Program, and Agency Review and Implementation.  While the 
use of the tools cannot guarantee a successful complex contingency operation, not using 
the tools could lead to a disjointed American effort that all but ensures failure of the 
mission.62 
1. Executive Committee 
PDD 56 describes an NSC centered model for interagency management.  Once it 
is determined that the United States will respond to a complex contingency, the Deputies 
Committee of the NSC establishes an Executive Committee, comprised of representatives 
of various USG agencies at the assistant secretary level, including agencies not normally 
part of the national security organization.63  This Excom is “the principle coordinating 
mechanism of interagency activities.”  According to the Handbook for Interagency 
Management of Complex Contingency Operations, the Excom’s purpose is to: 
• Provide unified policy guidance for agency planners of the operation 
• Develop a USG pol-mil plan for the operation 
• Integrate mission area plans within the overall USG pol-mil plan 
• Monitor the operation 
• Revise policy guidance, as needed 
• Update the pol-mil plan as necessary 
• Implement Deputies and Principals policy decisions 
• Oversee an after-action review at the conclusion of each operation 
• Disseminate lessons learned and improvements in interagency planning 
The Excom is designed so that the assistant secretary representatives are held 
personally accountable for their assigned part of the operation.  Excom members are not 
assigned to oversee their own agency efforts.  They are assigned functional areas that 
span agencies, such as refugees, elections, or demobilization, to develop a plan and 
coordinate.  The chairman of the Excom must also designate an agency to lead a legal 
and fiscal advisory sub-group to ensure that the tasks assigned to specific agencies are 
within the current legal and fiscal constraints of the agencies.  “The Excom approach has 
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proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, 
ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by 
senior policy makers.”64 
2. Political-Military Implementation Plan 
Development of the pol-mil plan is the “centerpiece of the integrated planning 
process.”  Representatives from the appropriate agencies working together to write the 
pol-mil plan: 
• Helps build interagency consensus on the key elements of the overall 
operation 
• Assists in synchronizing individual agency efforts 
• Enhances the transparency of planning among different agencies 
• Helps ensure that all key issues are raised during planning65 
According to the PDD 56 White Paper, the pol-mil plan centralizes planning, 
allowing decentralized execution during the operation.  PDD 56 describes eleven 
illustrative components to the pol-mil plan.  While each plan must be developed to fit the 
specific details of a particular operation the following components should be included in 
all pol-mil plans: 
• Situation Assessment.  A comprehensive assessment of the situation to 
clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, provides a multi-
dimensional picture of the crisis. 
• U.S. interests.  A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and the 
requirement to secure those interests. 
• Mission Statement.  A clear statement of the USG’s strategic purpose for 
the operation and the pol-mil mission. 
• Objectives.  The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished during 
the operation. 
• Desired Pol-Mil End State.  The conditions the operation is intended to 
create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or 
terminates. 
• Concept of the Operations.  A conceptual description of how the various 
instruments of USG policy will be integrated to get the job done 
throughout all phases of the operation. 
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• Lead Agency Responsibilities.  An assignment of responsibilities for 
participating agencies. 
• Transition/Exit Strategy.  A strategy that is linked to the realization of the 
end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, 
military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the international 
community. 
• Organizational Concept.  A schematic of the various organizational 
structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including a 
description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels. 
• Preparatory Tasks.  A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the 
operation begins (congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop 
recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media 
coordination, etc.). 
• Functional or Mission Area Tasks/Agency Plans.  Key operational and 
support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical parts of the 
operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, 
demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public 
services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social 
reconciliation, public information, etc.).66 
PDD 56 specifically requires the pol-mil plan to include “demonstrable 
milestones and measures of success.”  It must include planning for the transition from a 
complex contingency operation to a follow-on operation.  Lastly, PDD 56 requires the 
plan to be updated as necessary to reflect any changes in the situation or the mission.67  A 
detailed “Generic Pol-Mil Plan” can be found in Appendix B.  It is constantly updated 
and used as a guide for the development of pol-mil plans in both training exercises and 
actual operations. 
3. Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal 
Once the pol-mil plan is drafted, PDD 56 calls for an interagency rehearsal.  This 
takes the form of a brief to the Deputies Committee.  First the intelligence representative 
gives an update of the situation, and then the NSC staff provides the context for the 
follow on briefs of the functional areas of the plan, describing the mission, objectives, 
end state, and concept of operations for the mission.  Next, members of the Excom 
responsible for functional areas—program managers—brief their areas.  This way 
problems or disconnects can be identified before the operation is executed.  “By 
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simultaneously reviewing all elements of the plan, differences over mission objectives, 
agency responsibilities, the timing of operations and resource allocation can be identified 
and resolved early.”  The mission area plans should answer the following questions: 
• What is the overall purpose of the functional element plan? 
• What is the current situation in the area of operations? 
• What are the key entry conditions and assumptions for the mission area 
plan? 
• What are the functional element plan’s purpose, mission, and operational 
objectives? 
• How does the mission contribute to the overall USG pol-mil plan? 
• What is the functional element plan’s concept of operation for 
accomplishing the mission? 
• What are the timelines/milestones to accomplish the mission? 
• How does the concept synchronize with the overall USG concept of 
operations? 
• What are the organizational structure and chain of authority for 
operations? 
• Who are the key players, from both the U.S. and others, and what are their 
roles? 
• What mechanisms are planned to effect civil-military coordination? 
• What difficulties, obstacles or resource shortfalls currently exist? 
• What constitutes success on the ground? 
• What are the unresolved issues pending decision?68 
Lastly, the synchronization matrix is used to determine if the functional areas are 
working in concert.  The sync matrix has the functional elements along the x-axis and the 
time, or phases along the y-axis.  The matrix is filled in to show how each part of the plan 
is conducted over time, and can be used as a guide to improve the integration of the 
functional plans.69 
The Deputies Committee uses three criteria to judge the pol-mil plan: 
effectiveness, integration, and executability?  To judge the pol-mil plan’s effectiveness, 
they must assess whether the functional plans support the overall mission and will 
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achieve the objectives consistent with the established milestones.  Integration is 
determined by assessing whether the agency efforts are complementary and synchronized 
within the overall concept of operations.  Lastly, the Deputies Committee assesses 
whether or not the plan is executable within agency legal, resource, and financial 
restraints.  The rehearsal is not intended to end the pol-mil planning process but instead to 
be part of an iterative process.  If necessary, and time permitting, a second rehearsal may 
be held.70   
4. Interagency After-Action Review 
Once the complex contingency operation is completed, the Executive committee 
is charged with conducted an AAR.  For this process, the AAR is to be a guided 
discussion for the participants to identify for themselves what went right, what when 
wrong, and possible reasons why.  This review should include “a review of interagency 
planning and coordination, (both in Washington and in the field), legal and budgetary 
difficulties encountered, problems in agency execution, as well as proposed solutions.”  
The purpose of the AAR is to capture the lessons from the participants and then use them 
to improve the process for future complex contingency operations.71  The AAR is briefed 
to the Deputies Committee, and should include both the strengths and the weaknesses 
encountered in the operation.  It is not meant as a means to lay blame on any individual 
or agency.  The AAR is only useful if the lessons are applied to future operations.  The 
interagency training program gives an opportunity for the lessons from the AAR to be 
learned. 
5. Interagency Training Program 
PDD 56 mandates a training program to prepare officials to participate in 
managing complex contingency operations.  PDD 56 identifies the National Defense 
University as the executive agent for this training program and requires that they hold an 
annual interagency exercise with the assistance of the National Foreign Affairs Training 
Center and the Army Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College.  Its aim is to 
educate officers at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the development of pol-mil 
plans.  It also provides a forum for officers to meet their counterparts in different 
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agencies and learn about the capabilities that the different agencies bring to the 
interagency forum.  The training allows improvements to the PDD 56 process to be tested 
before they are used in actual crises.  PDD 56 also calls on government educational 
institutions to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their courses of study.72  A 
secondary benefit of the training program is that it expands the number of people who are 
familiar with the process.  As more people are trained and become familiar with it, it is 
more likely that it will be used when a complex contingency operation occurs. 
6. Agency Review and Implementation 
Lastly, PDD 56 requires the agencies involved in complex contingency operations 
to review their “structure, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, and 
crisis management procedures” to ensure that they are applying the lessons learned in 
past complex contingency operations.73   
D. CONCLUSION 
While PDD 56 made great strides in systemizing the USG interagency response to 
complex contingency operations, replacing the previously ineffective ad hoc 
organizations of the early 1990s, it took some time before the process caught on.  PDD 56 
mandated training sessions in December 1997, May 1998, and August 1998 helped to 
introduce the process to participants across the government.  The first real test of PDD 56 
would come in late 1998 through early 1999 with American involvement in Kosovo. 
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IV. KOSOVO CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia continued in 1998 when violence 
erupted in Kosovo—a region in Serbia dominated by a large population of ethnic 
Albanians.  From February 1998 until June 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and Serbian security forces faced off in steadily increasing levels of violence.  Before it 
was over NATO would conduct its first war, and the United Nations Mission to Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed to the region to enforce 
Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia.  From the U.S. government perspective, the events in 
Kosovo led to the first implementation of PDD 56.   
Interagency collaboration suffered from fits and starts during the Kosovo ordeal, 
but eventually the interagency process produced a comprehensive political-military plan 
that was adopted by both NATO and the UN, providing the basis for both the military 
and civilian implementation missions to Kosovo.  This case study examines events from 
July 1998 until July 1999.  The first section describes the Serbian summer offensive and 
the U.S. response; Ambassador’s Holbrooke’s October mission; the Racak massacre and 
Rambouillet; the bombing campaign’s unexpected consequences; the interagency 
planning for the peace in Kosovo; and concludes with some lessons learned from the 
operations in Kosovo. 
B. THE SUMMER OFFENSIVE 
In February 1998 the KLA began to challenge Serb security forces in a series of 
small-scale clashes.  In July, the Serbs began a full-scale campaign against the KLA.  
This “offensive in Kosovo aimed at sealing the border with Albania, minimizing the flow 
of support to the KLA, eliminating the KLA leadership, and pacifying the Kosovar 
Albanian population.  The scorched-earth campaign resulted in extensive destruction of 
Kosovar villages and the displacement of 400,000 Kosovars.”74  In response to this 
renewed violence in the Balkans, on August 11, 1998 the Deputies Committee of the 
National Security Council directed seven senior managers from the NSC staff, OSD, 
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DOS, CIA, and the Joint Staff “to develop a plan that would compel Slobodan Milosevic 
to cease his crackdown on the Kosovars.”75  The group was never designated an Excom, 
and it was staffed at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level – one level lower than PDD 56 
designates for an Excom.  But this group largely acted as an interagency collaborative 
body tasked with developing a pol-mil plan.  One member of the group had even helped 
to write PDD 56, so the Excom process was being used in practice, if not in name.76 
The Deputies Committee gave the group four weeks to develop their plan.  In 
their first meeting they developed a table of contents for the plan and split up the work.  
Although, the plan did not follow the generic pol-mil plan format as laid out in PDD 56, 
all the subjects were covered.  They started with purpose and intent, including policy 
questions the Deputies Committee would have to answer.  The second section of the plan 
was a strategic analysis of the situation in Kosovo.  The third section discussed the 
relation between force and diplomacy and addressed four key issues: 
• Keep NATO united and engaged 
• Keep the Russians out of the game 
• Keep the issue out of the UN Security Council 
• Ensure adequate maintenance of domestic support for any U.S. action77 
The fourth section covered advance preparations; fifth was potential reactions from 
Belgrade; sixth included Russia’s reactions; seventh was the reactions from the rest of the 
world; eighth reviewed humanitarian issues; ninth covered human rights; and lastly, the 
tenth section reviewed post-conflict requirements.78  This plan became known as the pre-
settlement plan.79   
When the group reconvened to review the plan in its entirety, it became evident 
that gaps existed, in particular, intelligence had not been integrated in the plan at all.  
After a three-hour session, the issues were resolved.  On September 4th the Deputies 
Committee was briefed on the plan, which recommended bombing to get Milosevic to 
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cease hostilities.  Based on the anticipated consequences as laid out in the plan, the 
Deputies decided against the bombing option at that time.  Despite deciding not to follow 
the interagency group’s recommendation, the planning process was a success in that it 
facilitated an informed decision by the Deputies Committee.  When the plan was briefed 
to the Principals Committee, a senior policy manager described the ensuing discussion 
“as the highest level (in regard to quality) discussion he had ever seen conducted in 30 
plus years of high government service.  If the pol-mil plan’s purpose was to inform the 
decision makers, it clearly did its job here.”80  It was decided that Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke would be sent on what became known as the “October Mission” to convince 
Milosevic to end his brutal operation in Kosovo. 
C. THE OCTOBER MISSION 
Holbrooke met with Milosevic for nine days and finally achieved an agreement 
that resolved what Ambassador Holbrooke characterized as “an emergency inside a 
crisis.”81  In other words, Milosevic had agreed to end the military campaign in Kosovo – 
the emergency – but no resolution would be found on the underlying political issues that 
led to the conflict – the crisis.  The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement had three major 
parts.  First, Serb compliance would be monitored by a verification regime, which 
included over-flights and observers on the ground in Kosovo.  Second, Christopher Hill 
was identified as an international mediator.  Lastly, the Serbs agreed to a timetable to 
begin talks with the Kosovar Albanians.  The October mission had some limitations 
according to Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon. 
First, for all the focus on verification, the details of what was to be 
verified… were left vague.  Second, although the verification system set 
up in Kosovo was able to monitor Serb compliance, it was incapable of 
enforcing it.  Indeed, the vulnerability of unarmed monitors operating in 
an area teeming with Serb forces seriously undermined NATO’s ability to 
threaten or use force in case of Serb noncompliance.  Third, in ignoring 
the Albanian side of the equation, the agreement offered no effective way 
to prevent the Kosovar Albanians from attempting to exploit the opening 
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created by the retreat of Serb forces….  In this way, the agreement may 
have contained within it the seeds of its own demise.82 
Now that an agreement had been reached, a plan had to be developed for what 
became known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).  In this case the planning 
was conducted at U.S. European Command, with the assistance of a senior manager from 
OSD, and representatives from State and the CIA.  Since the KVM was to be carried out 
by the OSCE, the U.S. developed plan did not contain much detail, and was presented to 
both the OSCE and the UN as a “concept brief.”83  This concept brief became the basis 
for the mission that was deployed to Kosovo. 
At the same time that the KVM plan was being developed, State Department 
officials chaired an interagency planning team in developing a “post-settlement” 
implementation plan.  Working from the Haiti experience, they integrated military and 
civil tasks to implement a peace agreement, which included tasks such as public security, 
elections, and reconstruction.  This planning effort never had the backing of the agency 
leaders or any high-level interagency group, and finally shut down in January 1999.84  No 
one knew what steps the United States or NATO were willing to take to create or enforce 
a peace agreement in November and December.  The situation was still too uncertain. 
D. RACAK MASSACRE AND RAMBOUILLET 
Secretary of State Albright never believed that Milosevic would uphold his side of 
any agreement unless NATO proved that they were willing to use force.  Albright 
thought the agreement was failing and wanted to target Milosevic with direct pressure.  
She had her spokesman James Rubin tell the press, “Milosevic has been at the center of 
every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade.  He is not simply part of the 
problem; Milosevic is the problem.”85  In December, the head of the KVM, Ambassador 
William Walker said that “both sides have been looking for trouble and they have found 
it.  If the two sides are unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 
unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate their attempts to go after each other.” 86  No one in 
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Washington, except Secretary Albright, was ready to give up on the Holbrooke-Milosevic 
agreement yet.   
On January 15, 1999, the Principals Committee met to discuss a thirteen-page 
Kosovo strategy paper known as October-plus.  It proposed strengthening the KVM with 
more personnel, helicopters, and bodyguards; training an Albanian police force; and 
preparing for summer elections in Kosovo.  The goal of the October-plus strategy was “to 
promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent the resumption 
of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; [and] preserve U.S. and NATO 
credibility.”87  Albright came to the meeting prepared to offer other options.   
She noted that the October agreement was about to fall apart….  Hill’s 
negotiation efforts were stymied by Serb obstructionism and Albanian 
fragmentation. The administration now faced a ‘decision point.’  It had 
three options: ‘stepping back, muddling through, or taking decisive steps.’  
As violence escalated and a new humanitarian crisis loomed, stepping 
back was not a real option.  As for muddling through, at best it might 
postpone the inevitable collapse of the October agreement; at worst it 
amounted to what one senior NATO official termed ‘a strategy of 
incrementally reinforcing failure.’  That left decisive steps.  …she 
emphasized that ‘Milosevic needed to realize that he faced a real potential 
for NATO action.  If he did not get that message, he would not make any 
concessions.’”88 
The Principals opted for the October-plus option, or Albright’s muddling through 
option.  After the meeting, she was quoted as saying, “We’re just gerbils running on a 
wheel.”89  The PDD 56 process was not being used, and at this point the planning for 
Kosovo resembled the planning that had occurred in responding to Bosnia. 
The Principals Committee would not be satisfied by their decision for long.  
Within hours after they adjourned from the January 15 meeting, the Racak massacre was 
discovered.  Within hours, Jim Steinberg convened a meeting of the Deputies Committee 
with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA.  
State argued for immediate air strikes, and Defense asked what would be the objective.  
The group met for several days and made no decisions.  Meanwhile, Secretary Albright 
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and her staff were working on a new strategy.  Using input from Alexander Vershbow, 
the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Albright suggested the following strategy at a Principals 
Committee meeting on January 19. 
Albright’s strategy consisted of an ultimatum to the parties to accept an 
interim settlement by a date certain.  If the parties accepted the deal, 
NATO would commit to its enforcement with troops on the ground.  
However, if Belgrade refused to endorse the plan, NATO’s standing 
orders to its military commanders to commence a phased air campaign 
would be implemented.  Albright was explicit about the strategy’s key 
assumptions.  First, since the allies would not deploy their troops on their 
own for fear of having to repeat the disaster of Bosnia, American troops 
would have to be part of any international force.  Second, Milosevic would 
never accept the need to negotiate seriously, let alone accept an interim 
settlement, if there was no credible bombing threat.  Third, further 
negotiations would lead nowhere; therefore, and interim deal had to be 
imposed through the threat and, if necessary, the use of NATO airpower.90 
On January 20th, President Clinton approved Secretary Albright’s plan, which laid the 
foundation for the peace conference at Rambouillet.  Once again, as he had done with 
Anthony Lake’s Endgame Strategy in Bosnia, President Clinton chose an option 
presented by one of his principal advisors, instead of a plan developed in an interagency 
forum. 
The Rambouillet Conference opened on February 6th, and was soon being called 
“Château Dayton.”91  The proposed agreement resembled the format of the Dayton 
Accords.  The agreement began with a brief framework agreement and was followed by a 
series of annexes, related to issues such as a constitution for Kosovo, elections, and 
military and civilian implementation.92  Timothy Garton Ash describes the talks: 
First, while all Western participants entered the talks in the hope of 
reaching an agreement, the U.S., and specifically the State Department, 
had a much clearer fallback position than its European allies.  This 
position was, as Albright herself subsequently put it, to achieve, “clarity.” 
If the Kosovar Albanians signed, and the Serbs did not, then even the most 
hesitant European ally (and the Congress, and the White House) must 
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surely be convinced of the need to bomb Milosevic into accepting 
autonomy for Kosovo. 
The talks continued through March 18th when the Kosovar Albanians were finally 
coerced into signing the agreement.  When the Serbs refused, the conference was 
adjourned, and six days later, on March 24th, Operation Allied Force, the air war over 
Kosovo, began. 
E. NATO’S FIRST WAR 
The “pre-settlement plan” from September, which had recommended a bombing 
campaign, was taken off the shelf, and the Deputies Committee began day-to-day 
oversight of the operation as NATO entered its first war.  “Excom duties were for all 
intents and purposes sucked upwards to the Deputies Committee.  The entire issue 
became so high profile, that it became a nearly daily agenda for them.  The added crush 
of time, and the full internationalization of the crisis… skewed the process away from 
any semblance of systemization.”93  Everyone expected the air war to last two or three 
days.  General Michael Short, the commander of the allied air forces said, “I can’t tell 
you how many times the instruction I got was, ‘Mike, you’re only going to be allowed to 
bomb two, maybe three nights.  That’s all Washington can stand.  That’s all some 
members of the alliance can stand.  That’s why you’ve only got 90 targets.  This’ll be 
over in three nights.’”  NATO’s commander of southern forces, Admiral James Ellis 
agreed.  “We called this one absolutely wrong.”94   
Another mistake that was made at the outset of the air campaign was to vastly 
underestimate the number of refugees that could be expected.  NATO intelligence had 
expected 200,000 refugees.  By the end of April there were 850,000 refugees and 
internally displaced persons.95  Foreshadowing of the Operation Horseshoe, the ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, can be found in a January conversation between 
Milosevic and General Wesley Clark.  Milosevic told Clark, “You know, General Clark, 
that we know how to handle these Albanians, these murderers, these rapists, these killers-
of-their-own-kind.  We have taken care of them before.  In Drenica, in 1946, we killed 
                                                 




them.  We killed them all.  Oh, it took several years, but we eventually killed them all.”96  
A repeat of 1946 seemed unrealistic in 1999, but the situation on the ground in Kosovo in 
March and April 1999 was not that different. 
The air war was poorly prosecuted on several levels.  There was no strategic 
clarity.  The military means were poorly matched to the political aims.  Leaders limited 
their options from the beginning by publicly declaring that there would be no ground 
troops.  There was little coordination between the diplomatic and military campaigns.  
There was an open hostility between State and Defense.  General Clark describes it as “a 
grudge match that went back to Bosnia.”97  All this occurred under the immense pressure 
of maintaining a fragile 19-nation alliance.  While the planning and conduct of the air war 
went so badly, the planning for peace, once it began, can be characterized as a success 
story. 
F. PLANNING FOR PEACE 
Once it became clear that the bombing campaign might last more than a few days, 
the Deputies Committee, in late March, tasked the Kosovo Excom to prepare a pol-mil 
plan for peace implementation after the bombing campaign ended.98  In the first week of 
April, 30 experts and planners from 18 different agencies formed an interagency working 
group to develop the pol-mil plan.  They quickly identified 14 mission areas—
Governance, Military, Refugee Repatriation, Humanitarian Relief, Demining, Police, 
Elections, Democratization, Administration of Criminal Justice, Human Rights, War 
Crimes, International Public Information, Financial, and Reconstruction.99  The group 
met at least twice weekly and brought together various position papers into a 
consolidated Mission Analysis.  “A network of interlocking working groups sweated the 
details the USG could pin down as State awaited diplomatic action which would define 
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the ‘super-structure’ – lead organizations, an actual UN mandate – and, of course 
compliance with NATO’s conditions.”100   
By mid-May a final product called the Kosovo Mission Analysis was approved by 
the Deputies Committee.  This document, which was not called a pol-mil plan so it would 
encounter less resistance in the international community, laid out the basic principles of 
the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR as it appeared in UNSCR 1244 – the UN 
mandate for UNMIK and KFOR.101  It also set the foundation for the four pillars of the 
civilian implementation effort: humanitarian support, governance support, institutional 
development, and reconstruction.  Human rights were seen as a part of each of the four 
pillars, and the need to create an international police force was also acknowledged.102 
As the plan was being developed in Washington, members of the interagency 
group shared the planning concepts with planners at the UN and other international 
organizations including NATO and the OSCE.  While the PDD 56 process was 
sporadically applied until March 1999, once it was fully invoked after the start of the air 
campaign to plan for the eventual peace, it was successful.  “The interagency 
coordination and planning effort that produced the Kosovo Mission Analysis was a 
flexible and highly effective implementation of the coordination mechanisms and 
planning tools of PDD 56.”103  PDD 56 was only partially implemented.  The Kosovo 
Mission Analysis did not follow the format of the PDD 56 generic pol-mil plan, but 
included all the pertinent information.  Critical to the success of the interagency effort 
was the oversight of the Deputies committee.  Their participation ensured that the 
relevant agencies participated fully in the process and “ensured accountability and 
coordination by involved agencies during the implementation phase.”104  In April the 
United States Congress passed a supplemental bill that supplied adequate funding for the 
peace implementation operation.  The comprehensive Mission Analysis is also credited 
with helping the administration achieve financial support from the Congress. 
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The overall mission of the International Provisional Administration (IPA) for 
Kosovo, as described in the Mission Analysis, was defined as follows: “The IPA will 
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”105  The specific missions were defined as 
follows: 
• Promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo, taking account of the 
Rambouillet accords and relevant annexes of UNSCR 1244 (1999). 
• Perform basic civilian administration functions where and as long as 
required. 
• Organize and oversee development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political 
settlement, including the holding of elections. 
• Transfer, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of 
Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities.  
• Facilitate political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, 
taking into account Rambouillet accords. 
• In a final stage, oversee the transfer from Kosovo’s provisional institutions 
to institutions established under a political settlement.  Ensure the safe and 
unimpeded return of all refugees and diplaced persons to their homes in 
Kosovo. 
• Support, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
rapid and effective humanitarian and disaster relief aid. 
• Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
recovery. 
• Maintain civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to 
serve in Kosovo. 
• Protect and promote human rights. 
• Cooperate and coordinate with ICTY.106 
The operational requirements for the IPA included “rapid and early deployment,” 
“maximum authority, flexibility, and political/legal legitimacy,” and a seamless interface 
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with KFOR.107  On June 10th UNSCR 1244 was passed and on June 12th KFOR and 
UNMIK deployed into Kosovo.   
G. LESSONS FROM KOSOVO 
Eric Newsom credits the success of the operation to the PDD 56 process. 
Before anyone was deployed in support of the post-bombing effort, we 
came to closure on an agreed strategy and plan.  Great and contentious 
issues were argued and settled before, not after, mission start-up, 
providing those who implemented the plan with clarity of purpose and 
division of labor.  I contend that the whole process was of great value, and 
a precedent for the future, even as subsequent events in Kosovo did not go 
according to plan.  As the late president General Dwight Eisenhower once 
said, “A plan is worthless, but planning is everything.” 
In the Report to Congress on Operation Allied Force, the interagency planning 
process was noted for coordinating the activities of different agencies, identifying issues 
for the consideration of the Deputies Committee, supporting international planning 
efforts, and developing measures of effectiveness for the operation.  At the same time the 
interagency planning process was singled out for improvement.  “Our experience in 
Operation Allied Force has shown that Presidential Decision Directive 56… had not yet 
been fully institutionalized throughout the interagency.  As a result of this experience, the 
interagency has applied the lessons learned to further institutionalizing PDD 56.”108  
Specific recommendations in the report to Congress requested “routine participation of 
senior officials in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations,”109 expansion of “the 
scope of policy actions considered during planning,”110 and improving the NATO pol-
mil process.111   
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V. ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential 
Decision Directive 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex 
Contingency Operations?  The answer to that question will be determined in two ways.  
First, the two case studies presented in Chapter II and Chapter IV, pre-PDD 56 and post-
PDD 56 cases will be compared using six variables.  Second, since the PDD 56 process 
was designed to be continually improved, its impact will be evaluated by examining the 
improvements to the PDD 56 process that have been implemented.  
B. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Six variables were chosen to compare the Bosnia and Kosovo case studies 
presented in this thesis.  While there are seemingly limitless variables that could be used 
to compare the two extraordinarily complex operations, the following six have been 
chosen so as to measure the impact of the PDD 56 process: 
1. Type of Planning 
2. Depth of Planning 
3. Timing of Planning 
4. Decision Process 
5. Funding 
6. Monitoring and Modification 
The first three variables – type, depth, and timing of planning – deal with the quality of 
planning in the complex contingency operations.  PDD 56 lays out a process that is to be 
followed to achieve collaborative and comprehensive interagency planning.  These three 
variables will reflect the impact that PDD 56 has had on planning.  The fourth variable, 
the decision process, addresses a by-product of planning.  While a plan provides guidance 
for the conduct of an operation, it also provides a systematic examination of various 
aspects of a problem.  This can serve to inform decision-makers with details and 
consequences that were unknown or unaccounted for when the decision to act was first 
considered.  This variable illustrates the idea that it is not necessarily the plan, but the 
process of planning that is so vital to success.  An examination of this variable will show 
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the impact of the PDD 56 planning process on decision-making.  The fifth variable, 
funding, addresses one example of the many problems that crop up in implementation.  If 
details, such as funding, are not addressed prior to the implementation, they will surely 
become problems during the implementation.  Funding is a problem that was specifically 
identified in PDD 56.  This variable will show how addressing details in advance 
mitigates the problems that the implementation team will face in the field.  The last 
variable, monitoring and modification, addresses one of the primary responsibilities of 
the Excom – the day-to-day oversight of the operation.  That the organization is 
responsive to changing conditions is critical for the ultimate success of the operation.  
This variable will be used to determine if the PDD 56 process is more responsive to 
changing conditions. 
1. Type of Planning 
Planning was either functional (stove-piped) alone or both functional and 
interagency (collaborative).  Functional planning within the various agencies is required, 
but problems arise when it is not done within a pol-mil plan’s framework.  In the absence 
of such an interagency framework, decisions are made to act, somewhere near the top, 
and it is left to the individual departments and agencies to make their plans, based on 
their own procedures, assumptions, and goals.  Problems then occur when various 
agencies deploy to the region and attempt to carry out their individual plans, leaving 
operators to work out where efforts are overlapping or contradictory.  Interagency 
planning from the beginning allows the agencies to develop common goals and 
assumptions and develop procedures to work together.  In Bosnia the planning was 
primarily stove-piped.  Military planning was conducted in secret, and short of calling 
Deputies Committee meetings, civilian agencies could not get any answers in what they 
were planning.  Interagency planning in Bosnia was limited to resolving three policy 
questions, the IFOR mandate, the exit strategy, and the extent of American and NATO 
support to the civilian implementation.  The organizational structure that was developed 
for Bosnia, intentionally compartmented the military and civilian parts of the operation.   
In the Kosovo case, both stove-piped and interagency planning occurred, at 
several points during the crisis, culminating with an Excom that addressed fourteen 
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separate issues that crossed agency lines.  Planning was conducted in an iterative fashion 
whereby interagency planning occurred to identify common objectives, then participants 
were assigned areas to develop plans, then the whole group reconvened to identify and 
resolve potential problems at the seams.  The PDD 56 process facilitated this more 
effective type of planning. 
2. Depth of Planning 
The depth of planning variable examines how far down into the agencies the 
interagency planning occurred.  In Bosnia, planning was compartmented below the 
Deputies Committee.  In Kosovo, interagency planning occurred at the Deputies 
Committee, Excom, and several interagency working groups below the Excom.  The 
deeper into the organization that the planning reached, the more one can capitalize on the 
expertise of operators in each of the agencies. 
3. Timing of Planning 
Planning can occur in advance of a crisis, as it is developing, and as the operators 
are deploying or “on-the-fly.”  Advanced planning is the most deliberate and systematic 
approach where planners are given the opportunity to look at various options ahead of 
time, but it is also leaves planners dealing with the most uncertainty.  Wildcards or 
unexpected events can make a plan developed in advance irrelevant, but the planning 
process creates a cadre of people who have already considered the problems from many 
angles and who are best prepared to deal with unfolding events.  Planning that occurs 
while the crisis is developing usually occurs while events are rapidly changing, and the 
situation is at its most chaotic.  There are still many options to choose from, but planners 
may find some of them cut-off as events develop on the ground.  Planning that is 
conducted “on-the-fly” can be best characterized as making the best of a bad situation.  
By this point, there are usually very few options.  The need to do things “on-the-fly” or 
make significant changes after the operation begins tend to reflect a lack of advanced 
planning.   
In the case of Bosnia, the military and civilian commanders spent years trying to 
make something work well even in the absence of major changes in the situation.  It 
became quickly clear that policy debates that were never resolved in Washington created 
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an organization incapable of achieving success.  Since then, several groups have 
reexamined the organization and mission of the IFOR and civilian implementation force.  
In Kosovo, much of the planning was conducted in advance.  The unexpectedly extended 
nature of the air campaign provided enough time for contentious issues to be settle ahead 
of time, and not left to those on the ground.  This provided the operators a clarity of 
purpose and division of labor that everyone understood going into the operation. 
4. Decision Process 
Decision process options are top-down or bottom-up.  Top-down decision-making 
allows a few number of people make decisions for everyone.  This process is usually 
makes it easier to get to a decision in very complex operations, but rarely will it be the 
right decision because the issues extend beyond the understanding and knowledge of a 
small group of people.  Top-down decision-making is best suited to simpler problems.  
Bottom-up decision-making includes as many stakeholders as possible, capitalizing on 
their expertise and knowledge.  It is best suited to laying out options and examining the 
potential consequences of each choice.  In Bosnia decision-making was top-down.  
Decisions were made at the Deputies Committee and higher with little input from below.  
In Kosovo, interagency groups laid out options and consequences to inform decision-
makers, and at least in the beginning of the developing crisis in September 1998, a 
different decision was made because of the systematic examination of that option’s 
consequences. 
5. Funding 
In Kosovo, Congress allocated funding two months in advance of the deployment 
of the operation.  This early funding, difficult to achieve when the nature of how the 
events would unfold was uncertain, allowed the operation to be deployed quickly and 
without the delays that were seen in the deployment of aspects of all the previous 
complex contingency operations. 
6. Monitoring and Modification 
Monitoring and modification is a critical variable, because through this process 
the operation can adapt to changing conditions.  In Bosnia, there was no organization in 
Washington responsible for oversight of the mission in Bosnia.  This could possibly be 
attributed to the fact that the mission was international, and the civilian side was led by a 
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European.  In Kosovo, an Excom continued to monitor the operation, managing the many 
American agencies and forces deployed to the region.  Issues that were addressed by this 
group included details that were still unresolved after the initial deployment.  Issues 
managed by this group included civilian policing and the administration of justice, 
demining, and humanitarian relief.  Many of these problems will appear after the initial 
deployment of a complex contingency operations, and an Excom in Washington can help 
to manage the adaptation of the operation to include necessary responses. 
C. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PDD 56 PROCESS 
An important aspect of PDD 56 was that the process was designed to be 
continually improved.  Recognizing the complexity of these problems and the fact that no 
single process could deal with every foreseeable problem, the drafters of PDD 56 
included mechanisms for the interagency practitioners to improve the process.  In fact, 
half of the six PDD 56 mechanisms deal with improving the process.  After every 
operation an interagency after action review is to be chartered by the participants to 
address what worked, what did not, and how to fix the problems.  The training program 
provides a way to education the participants in the PDD 56 process as well as the lessons 
of past operations and exercises.  The training program is also a venue for testing out new 
ideas and improvements to the process.  Lastly, the agency review and implementation is 
a way for each agency to individually address problems within their own structure and 
procedures that hamper the USG response to complex contingency operations.  This 
section will examine two improvements to the interagency process that have been 
implemented as a result of lessons from the USG experience in actual and simulated 
complex contingency operations.  
1. Annex V 
A lesson that first appeared in the Haiti Operation Uphold Democracy, but that 
would be repeated in following exercises, was the disconnection between the strategic 
interagency and the operational interagency.  In Haiti, strategic interagency planning 
occurred well in advance of the operation, while at the operational level it did not occur 
until days before the operation began.  It became clear that guidance developed at the 
strategic level did not always filter down the agency stove-pipes to the operational level, 
leaving tactical operators in the field to deal with the consequences.  Also discovered in 
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the May 1997 exercise Tempo Brave, the guidance developed at the strategic level does 
not always meet the needs of the operational commanders.  Guidance from the Excom in 
Washington should be strategic, leaving flexibility for the operational commander to 
conduct his mission.  Clearly more work needed to be done in the connection between 
strategists in Washington and operational planners.  The creation of Annex V is a step in 
the right direction. 
In October 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an 
Interagency Coordination Annex (Annex V) be included in geographic CINC 
contingency plans.  SOUTHCOM is the first CINC to be tasked to develop these annexes.  
Their purpose it to “integrate CINC plans with other instruments of national power in 
support of NCA objectives – a method of articulating what ‘the CINC needs if a plan is 
executed.’  It identifies, by phase and category (Diplomatic, Economic, Humanitarian, 
etc.), major missions and tasks for interagency coordination.”112  Annex Vs go beyond 
complex contingency operations and let planners in Washington know the kinds of details 
the military commander needs to execute a contingency plan.  These annexes are 
forwarded to the NSC to identify those that need further development at the interagency 
level.  The NSC then designates an interagency group to write a contingency pol-mil plan 
to keep “on the shelf” to use in case the CINC plan is executed.  This contingency pol-mil 
plan can be used as a starting point to an Excom if the PDD 56 process is initiated and 
would allow for a more rapid American response to an emerging crisis.113   
In addition to Annex V, the strategic-operational link has been improved through 
the exercise program.  Exercises like SOUTHCOM’s Blue Advance 2000 have been 
integrated into PDD 56 training at the National Defense University, providing more 
realistic training to both the strategic planners and the operational commanders.  In the 
case of Blue Advance 2000, the interagency team wrote a pol-mil plan using operational 
inputs from SOUTHCOM, and the team continued to interact with the operational 
                                                 
112 James R. Bartran, PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects: Beyond the POL/MIL Plan, Army War 
College, 10 April 2000, 7-8. 
113 Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, “Posture Statement of 
General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 106th Congress, 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000, Supporting the National Security 
Strategy,” available from http://www.usis-australia.gov/hyper/2000/0208/epf208.htm; Internet; accessed 7 
May 2001. 
 63 
commander as the exercise evolved, more realistically exercising the Excom’s oversight 
responsibility.114 
2. Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group 
A problem in the PDD 56 process that was vividly highlight by the U.S. response 
to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, is the question of when to invoke PDD 56?  The operation 
responding to the humanitarian disaster caused by Hurricane Mitch in Central America 
included the deployment of more than 5,000 civilian and military personnel, cost nearly a 
billion dollars, and involved various agencies of the USG.  Joint Task Force Bravo, 
military personnel already stationed in Honduras conducted the initial U.S. response.  At 
that point, General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, 
recommended that the PDD 56 process by applied to the operation.  The President’s 
National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, rejected the recommendation, feeling that the 
detailed PDD 56 planning process would get in the way of immediate needs on the 
ground in Central America.  “General Wilhelm believes that the failure to immediately 
implement an effective interagency coordination and planning process in Washington 
caused delays in necessary relief activities, wasted resources and caused poor 
coordination in the field during the initial humanitarian response.”115  The PDD 56 
process can only work if it is applied.  The Contingency Planning Interagency Working 
Group helps to address this problem. 
To make an informed decision weighing the costs and benefits of the American 
response some level of advance planning must take place.  However, as shown in the 
response to Hurricane Mitch, planning under PDD 56 does not begin until the decision to 
intervene is already made, and even then sometimes PDD 56 is not invoked.  This 
conundrum reflects the tension between policy makers and planners.  Policy makers are 
concerned that if planning takes place, usually worst-case planning, it will drive the 
policy decisions in a direction that may not fit with political realities.  Planners are 
concerned that they will be unprepared if the policy makers make decisions without any 
advanced planning.  Additionally, the quality of the decision is less, if all the options and 
potential consequences have not been explored.  To deal with this dilemma, in December 
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1999, the National Security Advisor established the Contingency Planning Interagency 
Working Group (CPIWG), thus expanding the scope of PDD 56.116  The primary purpose 
of the CPIWG was to conduct advanced interagency planning for emerging hot spots 
around the globe.  It also provided a forum to receive Annex Vs from the DoD and 
conduct interagency planning in support of the CINCs’ standing war plans.117  The 
CPIWG was tasked to meet regularly to: 
• Assess potential contingencies and make recommendations for the 
development of political-military plans to manage them. 
• Oversee political-military plans contingency planning and provide 
reaction and comment to DoD regarding interagency involvement 
contained in CINC plans. 
• Review and provide advice and recommendations to senior leaders on 
possible follow-on efforts. 
• Provide policy guidance on the implementation of the interagency training 
and after-action review components of PDD 56118 
The CPIWG was chaired by a representative from the NSC, and included representatives 
from the DoD, DOS, Treasury, DOJ, Transportation, Commerce, USDA, DOE, OMB, 
CIA, USAID, and the U.S. Mission to the UN.119 
 In its first real world test in late December 1999, the CPIWG recommended to the 
Deputies Committee that the PDD 56 process be applied to the emerging situation in 
Burundi.  In December, Nelson Mandela was appointed as Special Mediator in Burundi.  
The CPIWG felt that the United States was unprepared to respond in support of a peace 
agreement.  In January 2000 a Burundi Excom was formed.  The Excom met in January 
and February and developed an assessment of the situation in Burundi and a pol-mil plan 
based on several possible outcomes of the peace process.  The CPIWG is a mechanism 
that finally allows the USG interagency process to be proactive rather than reactive.120 
 In February 2001, the newly elected Bush Administration published National 
Security Presidential Decision 1 (NSPD 1), which laid out the organization for the Bush 
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administration’s NSC.121  In NSPD 1, President Bush rescinded all Clinton PDDs, 
specifically including PDD 56, and created 17 Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) to 
replace the Clinton IWGs.  In April 2001, four additional PCCs were created, including a 
Contingency Planning PCC (CPPCC).  The Bush administration’s CPPCC fist met in 
May 2001 and assumed identical responsibilities of the Clinton administration’s 
CPIWG.122  The fact that this organization—CPIWG/CPPCC—was resurrected provides 
a further demonstration of its usefulness.  The primary product of the CPPCC is 
contingency plans, which are classified, since they have not been executed.  While the 
exact number of these plans is unknown at the unclassified level, they are another 
concrete example of the impact of PDD 56. 
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Unlike Presidential administrations, problems rarely have terminal dates.  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower123 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential 
Decision Directive 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex 
Contingency Operations?   
PDD 56 has improved civil-military relations in the response to complex 
contingency operations and has created a civil-military unity of effort that was unheard of 
in the early 1990s.  The operation in Kosovo is a success story of that effort.  Difficult 
multi-dimensional problems were resolved ahead of time, and an organization, the 
Kosovo Excom, was in place to be able to effectively deal with additional problems as 
they appeared.  This improvement was a result of both following the process described by 
PDD 56, but also through the training program that prepared participants for 
implementing and improving the process.   
The PDD 56 process has several limitations.  It is only effective when policy 
issues can be sufficiently resolved prior to planning.  The process of developing the pol-
mil plan should help to identify those issues that are unresolved.  Also, the conduct of 
military operations leading to a complex contingency operation, such as a peace 
implementation, can drastically alter the conditions within which the peace 
implementation must take place.  Combat operations should be considered as a phase in 
the complex contingency operation.  PDD 56 only applies to the strategic level of 
planning and oversight.  Systematic interagency coordination is equally important at the 
operational and tactical levels.  Lastly, PDD 56 only includes the U.S. government in 
operations that are rarely unilateral.  One of the critical aspects of coping with wicked 
problems is to include all the stakeholders.  PDD 56 leaves out many stakeholders 
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including, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, warring parties, 
and victims.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since PDD 56 has proven to have a positive impact on the interagency 
management of complex contingency operations, it should be resurrected in the current 
administration, and consideration should be given to widening the scope of the document 
to include interagency issues beyond complex contingency operations.  Managing the 
proliferation of issues that span agency responsibilities—including the newly created 
Homeland Security Agency, which has been charged with coordinating 40 different USG 
agencies that are each responsible for some aspect of homeland defense124—would 
benefit from a systematic approach for the management of interagency issues, to include 
future complex contingency operations.  It took several years for the United States to 
learn to deal with complex contingency operations, a significant shift from the Cold War 
national security posture.  We cannot afford to take as long to relearn the same lessons 
today.   
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The primary areas for future research deal with applying the PDD 56 process to 
two new levels of analysis, first horizontally, then vertically.  First, since PDD 56 has had 
a positive impact on the USG interagency’s ability to manage a complex contingency 
operation, a future study should examine a similar approach for the larger international 
management of complex contingency operations, or a horizontal expansion of the scope 
of a PDD 56-like process.  Additional challenges that exist at the international level 
include much greater number of stakeholders with vastly different agendas, as well as the 
lack of a final authority to resolve disputes.  Where in the USG agencies can turn to the 
President to decide issues, no such authority exists.  It would be interesting to examine if 
this process could work in the absence of such authority.   
The second approach that should be examined expands the scope of PDD 56 
vertically.  Already, some improvements have been made to connect the strategic PDD 
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56 plan generation to the operational military commanders, and ad hoc Civil Military 
Operations Centers (CMOCs) can be found in most complex contingency operations.  
This connection from the strategic to the operational to the tactical levels needs to be 
improved, as well as the interagency collaboration at the operational and tactical levels.   
Lastly, since problems do tend to last beyond presidential administrations, 
interagency doctrine that spans presidential administrations should be considered.  It is 
problematic that with every new administration, every presidential document is 
rescinded.  Writing a PDD 56-like process into law seems, at first blush, to be the 
solution.  I would submit that by putting it into law, the process would become frozen in 
time, and would not be able to be adapted as needed to deal with what will surely be 
rapidly changing situations.  A middle ground needs to be found.   
Presidential Decision Directive 56 was novel in that it created a process that could 
cope with very complex problems and then adapt itself to deal with emerging situations.  
The genius of PDD 56 lies in its focus on process and not product.  It should continue to 
be relevant as long as the government must face issues that cross-departmental or agency 
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APPENDIX A: THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
The National Security Council is a coordinating organization in the executive 
branch of the U.S. Government.  The National Security Act of 1947 established the 
National Security Council for the purpose of “the integration of domestic, foreign and 
military policies.”125  The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also 
known as the National Security Advisor, chairs all NSC meetings.  He must fulfill the 
dual role of both advisor to the President and “honest broker” between the various 
departments who have a role in national security issues.  He also oversees the permanent 
staff of the NSC.  While it plays a large role in the management of American national 
security, the NSC staff has never numbered more than two hundred, making it much 
smaller than the any of the agencies and departments whose efforts it coordinates. 
The statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of 
State, Secretary of Defense, and others whom the President sees fit to include.  The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the military advisor to the NSC.  The 
Director of Central Intelligence is also a frequent participant.126  As a new President 
comes into office, one of his initial actions is to establish the framework within which the 
NSC will operate.  The basic form has largely remained the same over time, but the size 
of its staff and breadth of its power has tended to reflect the personality of the President. 
On January 21, 1993, President Clinton signed PDD 2, which described how his 
National Security Council would be organized.  A formal meeting of the Clinton NSC 
was rarely convened, instead most Cabinet-level deliberations occurred at Principals 
Committee (PC) meetings, without the presence of the President.  Its main role was to 
formulate and discuss options.  Below the Principals Committee was the Deputies 
Committee (DC), made up of under-secretary or deputy level administrators representing 
the principals in the NSC.  The Deputies Committee was charged with day-to-day crisis 
management and preparing issues for the Principals Committee.  The Deputies 
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Committee could establish Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) staffed at the assistant 
secretary level.127  “Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul of the 
process.  They may be ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional.  They function at a 
number of levels, meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy 
responses, and build consensus across the government for unified action.”128  Standing 
NSC IWGs in the Clinton administration were organized around both geographic regions 
or functional areas, such as Asian Affairs, European Affairs, Multilateral and 
Humanitarian Affairs, and International Economic Affairs.129  In recent times the 
Presidency has been more ‘operational’ than in the past.  The White House staff has been 
more involved in running the day-to-day operations of the government, than ever before.  
In this environment the NSC has emerged as a powerful organization that sometime 
appears in competition with the Departments of State and Defense.130 
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
The Department of State is principally responsible for American foreign policy, 
and the Secretary of State is the senior member of the Cabinet.  The State Department is 
also divided into regional and functional bureaus.  Regional bureaus, which do not match 
either the NSC regional bureaus or the Defense Department’s unified geographic 
commands, are further divided to individual countries at the Desk Officer level.  
Functional bureaus have long been relegated to second-class status within the State 
Department, and their input into national security decision-making has been 
underrepresented.131  Despite the State Department’s statutory responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy, in the Clinton administration it seemed 
to lose its leadership role.  Ambassador David Litt, Political Advisor to U.S. Special 
Operations Command, expressed this in a speech before the Secretary’s Open Forum in 
June 2000. 
State is on the verge of assuming a merely subordinate role in complex 
contingency operations.  During the last decade or so we have devolved 
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into more of a tactical partner than a leader or strategic player in times of 
crisis.  This despite the incontestable fact that State and the Foreign 
Service are the primary repositories of foreign affairs experience and 
institutional expertise for the U.S. government.132 
Ambassador Litt continues to say that the PDD 56 mandated interagency working group 
has helped State become a full player in the strategic development again, but this 
continued status is by no means guaranteed. 
The Department of State works closely with the various departments of the United 
Nations in a variety of operations and missions overseas, is responsible for police affairs 
abroad, and operates embassies around the world.  These embassies are themselves 
interagency forums called country teams where the ambassador is responsible for 
“overseeing and coordinating all activities of the U.S. government within his geographic 
area of responsibility.  The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
U.S. Information Agency (USIA) are both previously independent agencies that have 
recently come under the direction of the State Department.  USAID is heavily involved in 
complex contingency operations.  The administrator of USAID is designated as the 
Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.  He works through the Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams 
(DART) to deal with the immediate response.  DARTs work under the direction of the 
ambassador.  USAID also provides U.S. food donations through direct donations or 
through a variety of public and private agencies.  USIA puts a public face on U.S. foreign 
policies to audiences abroad and tracks public opinion abroad.  USIA provides public 
affairs officers to embassies, and maintains contact with Army psychological operations, 
although there is little coordination.133 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The modern day Department of Defense (DoD) was established by the same 
National Security Act of 1947 that established the NSC.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and the 
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combatant commands make up the Department of Defense.  The Secretary of Defense 
and the President are the National Command Authority (NCA), with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as their principal military advisor.  The Joint Staff is 
responsible for the national military strategy.  The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy 
(J-5) is responsible for peacetime planning and is the military’s representative to the PDD 
56 process.  The military departments are led by civilian secretaries and through the 
military chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, training and supplying forces, 
but do not have operational control over them.  Unified commanders are either regional 
or functional, U.S. European Command or U.S. Transportation Command, for example.  
They have operational control over forces from all services in their regions of 
responsibility.  Some unified commanders also control international military 
organizations, for example the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command 
(CINCEUR) is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is 
responsible to both the U.S. NCA and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC).134   
D. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Also established by the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) is led by the Director of Central Intelligence, who is also responsible for 
the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, and the military services 
intelligence agencies.  The CIA supports the combatant commands through National 
Intelligence Support Teams (NIST).135  
E. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) led by the Attorney General provides legal 
advice to the President.  It includes several agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS).  The Department of Justice plays a critical role in complex 
contingency operations through the International Criminal Training and Assistance 
Program (ICITAP).  ICITAP is run by the Justice Department with guidance and funding 
from the State Department through USAID.  The importance of training police and 
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justice officials in countries recovering from complex contingency operations has been 
overlooked or underfunded in nearly every operation the United States has been 
involved.136  In addition to ICITAP, other lesser know DOJ programs, including, the 
FBI’s overseas programs, and the United States Marshals Service’s Special Operations 
Group add to the nation’s capacity to respond to the diverse requirements of complex 
contingency operations.137 
F. OTHER AGENCIES 
Many other agencies are involved in complex contingency operations on a smaller 
scale.  The Department of Agriculture (USDA) manages food aid programs overseas.  
The Department of Commerce (DOC) participates, under the direction of the State 
Department, whenever trade is involved.  The DOC monitors contracts issued through 
USAID and the World Bank, and works with USAID as a liaison between U.S. 
companies and overseas governments.  The Department of Energy (DOE) would become 
involved in a complex contingency operation that involved nuclear energy or weapons.  
The Department of the Treasury, operating from U.S. embassies, assists foreign 
governments with debt management and fiscal policy and reviews projects and loans.  
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) encourages U.S. private investment 
in countries that otherwise would be a poor risk, by providing insurance against currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence.  While this list is not exhaustive, it 
gives a pretty good picture of the complexities that have to be managed to provide a 
cohesive and comprehensive response.138  Before PDD 56, interagency collaboration in 
complex contingency operations was largely ad hoc – a difficult proposition for such a 
varied group of organizations dealing with some of the most challenging problems.  The 
results of this ad hoc approach proved to be less than successful. 
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APPENDIX B: GENERIC POL-MIL PLAN 
This appendix is a Generic Pol-Mil Plan for a Multilateral Complex Contingency 
Operation.  The PDD 56 White Paper lists eleven components of a pol-mil plan.  Two 
versions of a generic pol-mil plan can be found in Appendix B of the Handbook for 
Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations.  The generic pol-mil plan 
is updated periodically to reflect lessons from both training and real world operations.  





This section introduces the reader to the complex emergency by providing a short 
summary of the crisis, international response efforts to date, U.S. equities at risk and our 
policy aims in responding to the emergency.  It also summarizes the nature of the planned 
response and discusses the key policy issues that have emerged from the planning effort.  
Finally, the section outlines the Principals’ or Deputies’ guidelines to interagency 
planners for conducting the planning effort.  Key introductory elements include: 
• Purpose of the planning document 
• Summary of the conflict 
• Overview of international response efforts 
• U.S. regional interests at stake and policy aims 
• Nature of the planned response 
• International coalition’s civilian & military command, composition and 
structure 
• Discussion of key policy issues/decisions 
• Guidelines for interagency planning 
• Principals guidance 
• Planning scenario, assumptions and response parameters 
• Probable dates for plan implementation 
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• Agency planning responsibilities 
1.0 SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
This section describes the interagency’s assessment of the complex emergency.  It 
identifies essential elements of information that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
comprehensive assessment of the situation.  Its aim is to provide participating agencies 
with a clear picture of the operating environment.  Key sub-paragraphs for the situation 
assessment include: 
1.1 General Situation 
Provide a big picture perspective of the conflict.  Present a short history of the 
conflict—its origin, major factions, causes issues at stake, forces employed and relative 
power, scope of violence, activities of outside actors both friendly and hostile.  Describe 
the factions involved, faction leaders-warlords, the leader’s aims, and whether any of 
these aims would be negotiable.  Identify regional hegemons, if any, and the nature of 
their participation.  Outline U.S. equities at risk and the nature of the threat posed by each 
faction of the conflict.  Discuss the extent and nature of current multilateral involvement 
in the crisis. 
1.2 Ethnic Conflict Situation 
Analyze the foundations for ethnic conflict.  Discuss the host country’s ethnic 
divisions—social differentiation based on ethnicity, intensity of internal cohesion within 
ethnic groups, degree of ethnic hatred and fear between ethnic groups, expected costs and 
consequences of ethnic defeat for each ethnic faction, nature and power of ethnic group 
leaders (hard-liner or moderate), and quality of the leadership within each ethnic group.  
Outline the relationship of ethnic groups to the State—which ethnic groups own the State 
bureaucracy, legitimacy of the government among ethnic groups, how State privileges are 
distributed, how resources within the State are controlled, and patterns of State 
discrimination and human rights abuses. 
Discuss the territorial dimensions of the ethnic conflict—exclusive control of 
areas, access to economic resources, location and access of religious sites, etc.  Identify 
outside sources of support for ethnic group operations.  Discuss the stage of escalation or 
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de-escalation of the ethnic conflict—current stage of the fighting, how quickly can the 
fighting escalate, what are the escalatory dynamics, under what circumstances will the 
conflict escalate, and under what circumstances will the situation be amenable to 
mediation. 
1.3 Political Conflict Situation 
Assess the political roots of the conflict.  Identify the factions to the conflict and 
their political aims.  Discuss the nation’s internal political situation, nature of the host 
government, key centers of power, ruling party, and opposing factions.  Clarify the 
sources of internal political conflict (wealth, territory, resources, power, ethnic identity, 
religion, or ideology), intensity of grievances, level of political polarization and 
mobilization.  Describe the nature of local government (e.g. clans, tribes, or community 
groups), status of democratization, level of corruption, and government responsiveness to 
recent political and social reform initiatives. 
1.4 Military Conflict Situation 
Describe the military dynamics of the conflict.  Discuss the military, para-
military, and militia forces operating in the region, size of forces, military balance.  For 
each side of the conflict discuss the type of equipment and its capabilities, degree of 
military discipline and cohesion within each warring faction, operational military 
objectives of the factions.  Overall, present the types of forces and tactics employed, 
scope of violence and destruction, degree of political control over military organizations, 
and extent of arms flows—sources, type and quantity of weapons supplied.  Characterize 
the nature of the population’s support for the military. 
1.5 Weapons of Mass Destruction Situation 
Discuss the types, numbers, and location of weapons of mass destruction.  Assess 
current measures to safeguard their security.  Describe recent and expected movements of 
WMD systems.  Determine requirements for neutralizing WMD and their related 
platforms.  Assess the potential for use of WMD during the operation and assess possible 
consequences of WMD use.  Identify planning requirements (contamination, 
humanitarian toll, environmental impact, etc.) for consequent management operations. 
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1.6 Economic Conflict Situation 
Discuss the economic underpinnings of the conflict.  Explain how the factions, 
elite’s and their armed groups use the conflict for economic gain or profit.  For what 
economic gain does each faction wage the conflict?  How are economic gains achieved 
by continued fighting?  Clarify the spheres of economic control and influence of each 
faction. 
For each armed faction, explain how the faction’s military operations are 
sustained financially from outside sources—foreign assistance from patron states; 
donations from rich Diaspora’s; international trade in gems, timber or other valuable 
natural resources, drug trafficking; etc.  Also, explain how the faction’s military 
operations are sustained by internal sources to amass economic rewards—pillaging and 
plundering civilian populations, extortion, protection money, hostage taking, banditry, 
trading with the enemy, organized corruption, theft and black-markets, labor exploitation, 
manipulating contracts, stealing relief supplies, etc.  Discuss the economics of a soldier’s 
pay, arms sales, equipment purchases, and operations costs. 
In bringing the conflict to an end, discuss the compelling economic agendas that 
are at play for each warring faction/warlord.  How can these economic rewards for 
continued fighting be controlled or reduced—such as through economic sanctions, 
through denial of access to natural resources, through alternative markets, or through 
criminal apprehension and prosecution.  How could the rewards for peace and stability, if 
any exist, be put into play in the near term?  How could a peace process accommodate the 
interests of the rebel leadership?  If demobilization is being considered as part of the 
peace process, what realistic economic incentives, given the local economy, could be 
considered for ex-soldiers to offset the economic benefits of continued fighting?  What 
threats of punishment could be put into place by the government to deter further conflict 
for economic benefit?  Also, explain how the intervention force, civilian relief effort, and 




1.7 Humanitarian Situation 
Describe recent population movements, location and numbers of refugees and 
displaced persons.  Discuss the level and nature of humanitarian suffering.  Assess the 
threats of further ethnic violence.  Explain the distribution of the suffering by region, by 
class, or by groups.  Identify relief requirements for water, food, sanitation, shelter, 
medical services, heating supplies, household kits, farm tools, or other humanitarian 
needs.  Assess the potential for outbreaks of disease.  Identify the most threatening 
diseases and the capacity to treat them.  Assess stockpiles of urgently needed relief 
supplies in the region and the capability to get them to affected populations.  Discuss 
current and projected activities of the international relief community in the region.  
Determine the level of coordination among relief groups.  Outline support provided by 
neighboring states to the operation.  Specify transportation requirements for emergency 
relief efforts.  Outline any religious or ethnic restrictions or requirements that could affect 
relief operations. 
1.8 Landmine Situation 
Determine the extent and nature of the landmine problem in the country.  Locate 
mined areas in the vicinity of key installations and cities.  Assess whether mine 
awareness training is needed.  Determine current level of demining capacity.  Suggest 
mine clearance priorities. 
1.9 Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Situation 
Assess the scale of atrocities and identify the victims.  Identify the scale of ethnic 
violence and possible genocide.  Describe the nature of gross and systematic human 
rights abuses and possible war crimes.  Determine the likely perpetrators.  Name the 
officials who are likely responsible for gross and systematic human rights abuses.  
Determine who is compiling atrocity reports and describe the system for victims and 
witnesses to make such reports.  Determine what refugee populations are likely victims 
and potentially have evidence of atrocities.  Locate possible sites and outline how data 
collection and maintenance is being accomplished.  Assess requirements for forensic 
teams and equipment.  Assess protection requirements.  Assess the impact of “hate radio” 
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broadcasts and other activities to harm minority populations.  Determine the need for 
witness protection programs.  Clarify what measures, if any, have been taken by the 
international community to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
1.10 Public Security/Law and Order Situation 
Assess the level of crime, banditry and lawlessness within the country.  Assess the 
threat of bandits and criminal gangs against international operations.  Discuss the types of 
host country police forces, amount of police corruption, degree of enforcement of law 
and order, the nature, scope and acceptability of police violence, and degree of host 
country political control of police forces.  Discuss the cultural aspects of the host country 
legal system, amount of legal corruption, effectiveness of courts and administration of 
justice mechanisms, the quality of the penal system, and nature of police human rights 
practices and treatment of citizens. 
1.11 Local Civil Administration Situation 
Determine the nature and scale of civil administration in the country.  Determine 
the number of employees and annual expenditures for the following areas of public 
administration: emergency services, electrical power, oil and gas; transportation, 
communications, water and waste treatment, trash disposal, law enforcement & justice, 
education; health care, housing, human services, employment services, consumer affairs, 
business activities, agricultural activities, natural resource management, export and trade 
services, banking and financial services, postal services, and environmental management.  
Assess critical civil administration needs and the host nation’s capacity to meet these 
requirements.  Determine requirements for providing advice and assistance to the local 
civilian administration. 
1.12 Media, Public Information & Communications Situation 
Describe the existing public communications assets within the host country—
television, radio, newspapers, etc.  Determine whom—which faction—controls each of 
the public information systems.  Define the ownership/political orientation of local media 
and the content of its broadcasts or publication.  Judge the impact of on-going media 
efforts by friendly nations or organizations.  Assess the impact of “hate radio” broadcasts.  
 83 
Identify cultural or religious institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate 
popular support to the mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and 
related institutions.  Identify key opinion leaders and their willingness to support 
operations.  Identify broad-based groups of residents at the village, community, and 
regional level that should be consulted concerning proposed activities.  Identify storylines 
and key points that have impact on the population regarding the operation. 
1.13 Infrastructure and Physical Environment 
Describe the potential effects of climate and terrain on the operation.  Discuss the 
impact of the conflict/natural disaster on the country’s physical environment.  Assess the 
condition of power generation and transmission systems.  Outline the condition of the 
country’s available infrastructure such as railway systems, airports, roads, bridges, 
communications, utilities, etc.  For each port (sea, air, rail, and river), determine the size 
and type of vessels (including containerized cargo) to be received and the port’s capacity 
for storage and its related support systems.  Specify requirements for additional assets or 
facilities to conduct anticipated operations. 
1.14 Foundations of Economic Activity 
Discuss the several basic financial issues associated with local commerce: 
viability of currency, monetary and exchange rate policy, banking, payments and 
settlements system, public finance capacity, revenue generation, trade regime and export 
sectors, legal framework regarding commercial, property, and privatization, and other 
factors of economic activity.  Assess the threat of corruption to establishing and 
maintaining legitimate economic activity.  Discuss the state of the economy, 
unemployment, distribution of wealth, types of natural resources, principal agricultural 
commodities, level and nature of production and trade, effect of sanctions (if 
appropriate).  Discuss the availability of electrical power, quality of the workforce, level 
of international investment, degree of financial market activity, degree of privatization.  
Assess support of government bureaucracy to private businesses, effectiveness of the 
government’s domestic business law and judicial system, extent of government graft and 
corruption in licensing, and quality and effectiveness of government economic policy. 
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1.15 Socio-Cultural Issues 
Explain key issues with respect to the country’s culture, traditions, and social 
institutions that bear on the success of the operation.  Highlight religious prohibitions or 
ethnic dietary restrictions that could affect humanitarian assistance operations or human 
rights monitoring.  Identify available coping mechanisms used by the population to cope 
with the crisis situation—extended family, armed militia groups, tribal support & 
security, hoarding, corrupt or abusive practices, migration, etc.  Identify cultural 
institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate popular support to the 
mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and related institutions.  
Identify key opinion leaders and their willingness to support operations.  Identify broad-
based groups of residents at the village, community, and regional level that should be 
consulted concerning proposed activities. 
1.16 Support of the Host Government 
Discuss the level of cooperation by the host government with anticipated 
operations.  Specify the host government’s intent in supporting the operation.  Outlined 
what is needed to achieve and maintain host government support.  Assess the level of 
planning and operational capability to deal with both the military and civilian aspects of 
the operation.  Verify that we have negotiated a SOFA for the force.  Assess the host 
government’s administrative capacity to provide support to the operation.  Assess what it 
would take to gain host nation support and cooperation. 
1.17 Support of Neighboring States 
Describe neighboring state involvement with the host country.  Assess each one’s 
willingness to help with ensuring the success of the operation.  Determine if they are 
actively committed to reinforcing the mission including its specified tasks that could 
include arms control, refugee return, demobilization, elections, sanctions, basing rights, 
logistic support, control of hate radio broadcasts, etc.  Verify which neighboring states 
will (and those that will not) take constructive measures to support the operation. 
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1.18 Support of Regional and International Organizations 
Outline the key regional actors, major powers, international actors, and other 
participants and their interests.  Identify regional alignments with the factions, if any.  
Assess the unity of purpose among regional states regarding the operation, and consensus 
within the Security Council. 
Outline the extent of the current international presence in country.  List what UN 
peacekeeping forces, relief operations, or other NGO/PVO activities are operating in the 
host country and in the region.  Discuss the activities of private international business 
interests in the area and how those business interests affect the key players in the conflict. 
1.19 Situation on International or Regional Sanctions 
Discuss the scope and extent of international or regional sanctions that have been 
imposed on one or more of the parties to the conflict.  Assess the impact of the sanctions 
on the target.  Determine whether the sanctions would affect the performance of the 
international mission during the anticipated duration of the mission.  If the sanctions 
impair the performance of the mission, clarify what provisions in the UN mandate should 
be made to avoid problems with sanctions enforcement. 
1.20 Suitability of the Framework for Peace Agreement/Settlement 
Assess the political framework/agreement that governs the mission, if one exists.  
This framework for peace will normally result in a UN Security Council resolution that 
governs the operation.  Such a framework/agreement/settlement provides the context in 
which international mission will operate. 
Assess the scope of activities in the settlement.  A “signed settlement” is defined 
here as an agreement that attempts to address the war aims of the parties.  Settlements 
that only include terms for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty of 
combatants are not considered comprehensive “signed settlements” since they do not 
attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as governance, ethnic minority rights or 
self-determination.  Ceasefire agreements are better described as temporary measures to 
halt the fighting. 
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Assess the settlement’s objectives.  To be fully comprehensive, the “signed 
settlement” must address four key issues: 1) the cessation of hostilities in a way that 
reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party; 2) an acceptable plan to integrate 
previously warring factions into one state; 3) provisions to build an interim system 
government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; and 4) the creation of 
a new non-partisan national military force. 
Assess the settlement’s provisions to support third party implementation.  From 
the perspective of the implementation force, the key factors within an agreement include: 
1) incentives to ensure compliance by the parties; 2) mechanisms to resolve disputes; 3) 
procedures for peaceful change; 4) appropriate authority of the UN SRSG or the force 
commander to take action to interpret and facilitate implementation. 
Assess also whether the provisions of the “signed settlement” reflect (or at least 
do not go against) the history, traditions, culture, and values of the peoples involved. 
1.21 Consent and Commitment of the Parties 
Assess the ripeness of the conflict for resolution.  Identify the parties to the 
conflict and the degree of consent for supporting the operations of the international force 
and related civilian activities.  If entering into negotiations, assess the presence of critical 
conditions to support success of this activity: long vice short duration of the fighting, 
high vice low battle deaths, political vice territorial goals, and presence of religious 
cleavage among factions. 
If transitioning from negotiations to signing, assess the presence of critical 
conditions to support success: credible third party guarantees, power sharing agreements, 
military stalemate, political vice territorial goals, and effectiveness of mediation efforts. 
If transitioning from signing to full implementation of the agreement, assess the 
presence of critical conditions to support successful implementation: credibility of the 
peacekeeping force to verify security in DDR, and the scope of power-sharing 
arrangements (post-election government of national unity) that reduce political 
vulnerability of the faction leaders. 
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1.22 Diagnosis of Spoilers to the Peace Process 
Name the likely spoilers to the peace process.  Assess the perspectives of each of 
the “warlords” or potential spoilers involved in the conflict to identify how they will 
likely support (or hinder) implementation of key elements of the settlement.  For each 
spoiler: determine if the spoiler is inside or outside the peace process; if the spoiler’s type 
is limited, greedy, or total all or nothing; and if the spoiler’s source of power is controlled 
at the top or originates from the group’s population.  Characterize each spoiler: What 
demands will the spoiler make?  What are his intentions?  What leverage exists to shape 
the actions of the spoiler?  Explain why the commitment of any one spoiler may be 
problematic.  Assess whether our policy options to deter one spoiler will empower other 
spoilers. 
1.23 Possible Expansion or Escalation of the Conflict 
Outline several “what if scenarios”, however unlikely, which could occur in a way 
that would substantially expand the scope of the conflict or escalate the nature of the 
fighting and violence.  The “what is scenarios” may call for dramatically increased ethnic 
cleansing; splintering of a warring faction; expanded participation in the conflict by a 
neighboring state or a regional power; escalation of the conflict to include chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons; long-term loss of a strategic ally; a major environmental 
disaster; massive civilian rejection of U.S. actions; increased terrorism against key U.S. 
personnel or facilities; or expansion of the conflict into the “unrestricted warfare” domain 
of non-military warfare.  These scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the 
host nation, warring factions, neighboring states, a regional power, or a major power. 
1.24 Summary of the Initial Situation—Immediate Entry Conditions 
• The Parties and their Aims – the key parties to the conflict and their 
political aims 
• State of Fighting – status of the fighting and immediate threats to 
deploying forces 
• Agreement (Cease-fire) Compliance – degree of compliance by the parties 
to a cease-fire 
• Spoiler Threats/Countermoves – likely actions by the spoilers to hinder 
initial deployments 
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• Threats to Forces/Force Protection – threats and risks to deploying forces 
• Humanitarian Needs – size and locations of affected population and 
immediate relief needs 
• Atrocities and War Crimes – size and locations of war crimes sites and 
victims 
• Evacuation of Americans – number and needs of American evacuees 
• Condition of Key Bases – condition of power, transportation, and 
communications 
• Deployment Enablers – status of overflight, basing and bed down for 
deploying forces 
• Diplomatic Contacts – extent of diplomatic contact with key leaders 
• Public Awareness and Support—degree of indigenous public support for 
the operation 
• Host Nation Support – extent of support for the operation and provision of 
capabilities 
• Regional Support – support by neighboring states and key regional powers 
2.0 U.S. INTERESTS, STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MISSION AND END STATE 
This section states the U.S. interests at stake, the overall USG strategic purpose in 
conducting the operation, and the pol-mil mission statement.  Since these constitute the 
foundation of the pol-mil plan, all parts of the plan must be consistent with this section 
and be judged against it.  Paragraphs 2.1 through w.6 are intrinsically linked and must be 
tightly defined.  There should be a top-to-bottom rationale that ties interests, purposes, 
mission, objectives, and end state.  Our approach calls for continuity among these 
paragraphs.  The NSC should obtain interagency consensus, and at times resolve 
disagreements, on these issues as the planning process proceeds. 
2.1 U.S. Interests at Stake 
State the U.S. interests at stake (or promising U.S. opportunities & equities at 
risk) as a consequence of the crisis: undermine regional stability & development 
progress; weaken Alliance collaboration; reverse major power cooperation on security 
matters; threaten U.S. citizens and facilities in the region, jeopardize progress in 
democratization; empower corrupt/criminal governments; displace whole populations; 
incite fanaticism and export terrorism; divert scarce resources and diminish economic 
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growth; deny access to markets and trade; promote illegal weapons sales and mercenary 
operations; perpetrate human rights abuses and atrocities; and deny advancement of 
American values. 
2.2 U.S. Strategic Purpose 
Identify the U.S. strategic purpose or intent of the anticipated operation—what we 
hope to accomplish in conducting the operation.  The USG’s purpose may include any of 
the following: 
• Deter aggression 
• Contain the spread of conflict 
• Avert or mitigate a humanitarian disaster 
• Deter violence and stop human rights atrocities 
• Assist a government in establishing civil order and justice 
• Maintain a cease fire or truce 
• Implement a “comprehensive peace settlement” 
• Establish a UN Transitional Administration 
• Restore democratic government 
2.3 Mission Statement 
Present a clear and concise statement of what type of operation the USG will seek 
to accomplish and by whom.  The mission statement should include: 
• Who is conducting the operation (U.S., UN, NATO, OSCE, or an Ad hoc 
Coalition, etc.) 
• What type of operation will be conducted (Enforcement, Relief Operation, 
Peace Implementation Mission, Preventative Deployment, Deterrence, 
Cease-fire Implementation, Post-Conflict Peace-building, etc.) 
• When and under what conditions is the mission expected to occur and 
what is the expected duration  
• What shape, size and composition of the follow-on mission, if any 
2.4 Pol-Mil Objectives and Specified Tasks 
List the key objectives to be accomplished by the mission/intervention—these 
objectives are usually outlined in the Security Council mandate, if one is adopted.  Then, 
list the specified tasks that the mission—both civilian and military components—is 
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expected to accomplish over the duration of the operation.  If necessary, state what tasks 
the operation will NOT undertake. 
2.5 Desired Political-Military End State 
Defines a realistic, durable and desirable political arrangement (i.e., power-
sharing) that is acceptable by the parties and one that mitigates further conflict over the 
next five years, at least.  This is the most decisive component of any settlement.  This 
political framework is the “desired end state”—a preferred political-military arrangement 
that the parties agree (or are pressured) to implement—a political bargain that brings 
about an acceptable power-sharing arrangement coupled with a stable military balance.  
An end state that only addresses military security matters (e.g., such as terms for a 
ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty of combatants) does not resolve the 
underlying political conflict and therefore, would not mitigate further fighting among the 
factions.  A “cease-fire” is merely a temporary halt in the fighting—not a stable and 
lasting political accommodation.  A ceasefire agreement is not a “comprehensive signed 
settlement” since it does not attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as 
governance, ethnic minority rights or self-determination.  Such “ceasefire agreements” 
are better described as temporary measure to halt the fighting. 
To be successful, a signed “comprehensive settlement” must address four critical 
elements that constitute a desired end state.  These are: 1) the cessation of hostilities in a 
way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party; 2) an acceptable plan to 
integrate previously warring factions into one governing state; 3) provisions to build an 
interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; and 4) 
the creation of a new non-partisan national military and police force.  These four 
elements of a durable and stable political-military end state dominate all other end state 
conditions, and early attention should be placed on determining what the parties will 
accept for these arrangements. 
In failed states or divided societies, the central task is to figure out an acceptable 
political-military framework that the parties can agree to and support—one that will 
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encourage power sharing and military stability in a way that mitigates conflict among 
ethnic groups/warring factions for several years. 
A “comprehensive settlement” should establish new political and military 
mechanisms and practices that give incentives to the warring factions to mediate their 
differences rather than resorting to fighting to resolve political confrontations.  The 
settlement’s military arrangements (cessation of hostilities, confidence-building 
arrangements, arms control regime, demobilization, military balance, etc.) should support 
military stability and give security to all parties to the conflict.  Security guarantees will 
require outside intervention by a credible peacekeeping force along with a long-term 
effort to reorganize the country’s indigenous military and police forces.  The 
“comprehensive settlement” should include provisions that give incentives, rewards, or 
penalties to the political leaders to moderate divisive ethnic themes and to persuade their 
group members to support moderation, bargaining, and reciprocity among ethnic groups 
rather than military conflict. 
2.6 Measures of Effort and Measures of Progress 
This section outlines the metrics that will be used to measure performance and 
effectiveness of the mission itself (without prejudice to the efforts to achieve the desired 
political-military end state as described above). 
First, the section should outline significant measures that describe the level of 
effort completed by the operation: number of troops deployed, number of police stations 
under control, number of disarmament camps open for operations.  Obviously, these 
metrics define inputs, or the level of effort put forth by the mission, but they are useful in 
clarifying how much effort is being put forth in a specific mission area. 
Next, this section should specify the metrics to be used to measure progress—
describe the trends and interim goals that the mission will need to accomplish before the 
operation transitions to a follow-on mission (e.g., perhaps one led by the UN or an OSCE 
monitoring missions).  The nature of these goals can be both objective (e.g., number of 
weapons turned in by combatants) and subjective (e.g., public opinion survey data 
indicating strong support for local elections).  Depending on the mandate, the scope of 
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these goals will likely involve several areas—for example, the mandate could include 
such specific tasks for the mission to produce: gain territorial access, provide military 
security, reform the civilian policy, build civil order and justice, conduct humanitarian 
relief, resettle refugees, disarm and demobilize combatants, among others. 
These metrics used to measure these interim goals should integrate military and 
civilian dimensions of the operation in a manner that describes successful mission 
progress for a major stage (e.g. Phase III) of the operation.  In addition, these interim 
goals should be clear and realistic—for example: “Establish a suitable security 
environment that permits relief operations to be conducted by XXX in province YYY.” 
These interim goals should be described as specifically as possible.  Note that one 
should be clear as to whether one desires a change in conditions on the ground (e.g. 
newly elected officials gain control in all provinces) or simply the completion of a task or 
goal (e.g. complete elections in all the provinces).  Either may be appropriate, depending 
on how ambitious we want to be in establishing the interim conditions or goals for the 
operation, while recognizing the limits on availability of political and financial support 
for the operation. 
2.7 Transition/Exit Strategy 
Describe the transition/exit strategy that is linked to the realization of the 
conditions or achievement of our goals leading to the desired end state described above.  
Obviously, this transition or “hand-off” strategy is multi-dimensional in character, 
focusing on such tasks needed to be completed for a hand-off of responsibilities to a 
follow-on international entity such as the UN or to the Host Nation.  A transition/exit 
strategy requires the integrated efforts of both civilian and military officials within the 
USG and the international community. 
Management of a transition/exit strategy is an interagency effort.  It should be 
coordinated by an interagency working group, which would advise the Deputies 
Committee on the status of transition strategy planning and coordination within the USG 
and at the UN.  The interagency working group would be composed of appropriate USG 
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officials having political, humanitarian, military, regional, and UN expertise regarding 
operations in the region. 
3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATION, ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING 
This section describes conceptually how the mission will be accomplished—how 
the various components of USG policy (political, military, humanitarian, etc.) will be 
integrated to get the job done.  Structurally, the concept of operations is a time-phased 
description of how the complex contingency operation will unfold.  For each phase of the 
operation, task priorities are identified by functional components of the operation.  In this 
way, various agencies and non-government organizations can understand how their 
priorities merge with those of other agencies to accomplish the mission. 
3.1 Strategy for Successful Achievement of Political-Military Objectives 
Present the overall strategy for successfully achieving our political-military 
objectives—advancing the goals of the international community while undermining any 
opposition to the mission.  This overall strategy should include diplomatic, political, 
military and economic efforts within the region to contain the spread of the conflict and 
reduce the capacity of the opposition to resist efforts by the international community.  
The strategy may include several elements which are synchronized to decisively 
concentrate power relying on specific tool such as regional diplomatic efforts, military 
operations, sanctions on arms, diamond, drugs and other illicit operations, political 
pressure on patrons, isolation of key players, adverse media attention, and war crimes 
prosecution.  The range of options is limited by the political will of regional states. 
3.2 Strategy for Linking Force and Diplomacy 
Present the strategy that explains how force and diplomacy will be linked in a 
timely fashion to advance our policy aims.  State how our military and diplomatic means 
are to be integrated to successfully conduct the operation (or implement a settlement).  
Elements of this strategy should include building consensus among our allies for military 
action, making the legal and moral case for collective action to both the domestic and 
international audience, gaining the necessary agreements and resolutions for authorizing 
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use of force, conducting diplomatic communications to regional powers and 
organizations, and characterizing the possible outcomes of U.S. intervention. 
3.3 Strategy for Building an International Coalition 
Present the strategy for establishing an effective international coalition for getting 
the mission accomplished over the next 1-2 years of the mission.  Address the political 
foundations and the structural elements of the coalition leadership, composition and 
structure.  Identify potential weaknesses of coalition solidarity and how the coalition 
leaders will guard against any fragmentation of the coalition. 
3.4 Pol-Mil Concept of Operations 
Mission accomplishment calls for the timely integration of several functional 
dimensions of activity: diplomatic engagement, military security, humanitarian relief, 
political transition, and economic restoration, among others.  The pol-mil concept of 
operations for the mission typically has several phases, each of which will require priority 
efforts within many of the functional dimensions as noted below: 
• Phase I (Interagency Assessment and Preparation): The initial phase calls 
for a comprehensive interagency assessment, including deployment of 
assessment teams to gather information from all sources on the situation.  
Key agencies prepare appropriate organizations and forces for deployment 
to the crisis area.  Critical functional task priorities for Phase I are stated 
by mission area (see listing of mission areas in para 5.0): 
• Diplomatic Engagement Priorities: 
• Military Security and Regional Stability Priorities: 
• WMD Control/Consequence Management Priorities: 
• Humanitarian Assistance Priorities: 
• Internal Political Transition Priorities: 
• Civil Law and Order/Public Security Priorities: 
• Infrastructure Restoration Priorities: 
• Economic Restoration and Transformation Priorities: 
• Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Priorities: 
• Public Diplomacy and Education Priorities: 
• National Reconciliation Priorities: 
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• Phase II (Rehearsal, Movement, Civilian and Military Activity Build-up): 
This phase calls for multi-agency planning and rehearsals, strategic 
movement of assets, forces and civilian activities, and the establishment of 
local security, communications, airheads, logistic bases, and transportation 
systems in-country and/or in neighboring states.  Critical task priorities for 
Phase II should be stated as was done in Phase I above. 
• Phase III (Initial Entry Operations – NEO/Initial Entry/Emergency Relief): 
This phase may be executed nearly simultaneously with Phase II above, 
depending on the mission.  Include critical task priorities for Phase III as 
noted in Phase I above. 
• Phase IV (Stability, Political Transition, and Restoration Operations): This 
phase constitutes the longest part of the operation, requiring unity of effort 
among civilian and military organizations.  Include critical task priorities 
for Phase IV as noted in Phase I above. 
• Phase V (Post-conflict Peace-building, Transition & Military Force 
Drawdown): This phase calls for the continued evolution of the mission’s 
priorities toward civilian implementation, transition and hand-off of 
security responsibilities to a follow-on force or the host government, and 
then the drawdown of military forces.  The hand-off of security 
responsibilities is event driven, based on exit criteria for military forces.  
Civilian operations continue to function and flourish.  Include critical 
tasks priorities for Phase V. 
• Phase VI (End State Sustainment): This final phase calls for sustaining the 
end state via activities consistent with long-term U.S. policy in the region.  
Include critical task priorities for Phase VI as noted in Phase I above. 
3.5 Opposition Countermoves/Contingency Response Options 
Outline the possible negative responses or countermoves that could be employed 
by key opposition players, adversaries, or spoilers that would thwart the opposition.  For 
each possible response present a menu of options that we could use to either deter, 
preempt, or deal with these negative actions by the key player(s) involved. 
3.6 External Variables, Random Events and Wildcards 
Outline the important variables, random events and wildcards that could occur 
that would potentially thwart achievement of policy aims for the operation.  External 
variables include a description of likely negative reactions by neighboring states or 
influential regional powers, negative reaction by some UNSC members or other major 
powers.  Wildcards include random events or designated activities in the region or 
 96 
elsewhere that could undermine our ability to achieve success.  For each external variable 
and wildcard scenario outline a hedging strategy that we could use to counter such 
activity. 
3.7 Mission Organization in Theater (UN or NATO, OSCE, Coalition MNF,  
etc. as appropriate) 
Portray the international organizational structure for various components in 
theater. 
3.7.1 Command, Control and Coordination Plan (among all  
components) 
• UN Core Group/Friends Group/Peace Implementation 
Council 
• SRSG 
• Force Commander 
• CIVPOL Coordinator 
• Civil Affairs Office 
• Other key offices, including UNHCR 
3.7.2 Military Organization in Theater 
3.7.3 Civilian Police Organization in Theater 
3.7.4 Humanitarian Relief Organization in Theater 
3.7.5 Economic Development Organization in Theater 
3.7.6 Information/Public Affairs Organization in Theater 
3.8 U.S. Organizational Concept 
Portray the U.S. organization for various components in Washington, D.C., and in 
theater. 
3.8.1 Washington Interagency Policy Elements 
• Executive Committee (ExComm) 
• Interagency Working Group (IWG) 
3.8.2 U.S. Organization in Theater 
• Senior Steering Group 
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• US Ambassador and the Embassy Staff 
• CJTF Command and Staff 
• Coordinating Staff – CMOC  
3.9 Chain of Authority 
Describe the chain of authority and associated reporting channels for the 
operation. 
3.9.1 U.S. Chain of Authority 
3.9.2 UN (or NATO, OSCE, Coalition MNF, etc.) Chain of Authority 
3.9.3 Authorities of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
 General 
3.10 Strategy for Financing the Mission 
Describe how the mission will be funded over the long run.  In multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations, successful implementation will usually require millions of 
dollars in the first two years.  This section outlines the financial strategy to meet this 
substantial funding requirement.  The section clarifies the myriad of financial needs and 
associated funding mechanisms to pay for implementation during the first two years.  A 
UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission will be mandated to accomplish several 
military and civilian tasks (see Section 2.4 above) that will entail undertaking many 
humanitarian, governance, institution-building, security, development and human rights 
activities.  Most of these activities will cost a substantial amount, especially in the first 
two years. 
Since considerable funding is needed to support a myriad of tasks, a credible 
financial strategy seeks to tap into all potential sources of funds.  These funding sources 
include UN peacekeeping assessments, voluntary financial contributions from Member 
States, program funds from UN specialized agencies and international organizations, in-
kind support provided by NGOs, and revenue generation by the Host Country’s public 
administration.  Obviously, the UN or the World Bank will have to establish a Trust Fund 
to collect donor contributions, and the UN mission will have to administer funds in a 
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legally sufficient, transparent, and effective manner to ensure continued support by 
Member States.  Note that measures must be taken to ensure that corruption and bribery 
from within the Host Nation does not imperil effective and legal use of these funds by the 
international community. 
Major Funding Components 
• The UN mission: Funds are needed to pay for the UN missions 
civilian staff, the international civilian police, and UN 
peacekeeping force.  This component will be funded by UN 
assessed contributions.  While these UN assessments can pay for 
UN mission’s internal activities, these funds cannot be used to pay 
for “nation-building” and other non-peacekeeping type activities 
that the UN mission will supervise—these funds must come from 
other sources such as voluntary contributions. 
• Humanitarian Operations: Funds are needed to pay for 
humanitarian relief operations and restoration of basic services.  
Activities in this area are funding by normal humanitarian 
assistance program funds of relief organizations such as UNHCR, 
WFP and ICRC as well as voluntary contributions and in-kind 
relief provided by NGOs. 
• Military Disarmament, Demobilization and Transformation: Funds 
are needed to support disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the transformation of 
existing military organizations of the parties.  A trust fund would 
need to be established and supported by bilateral voluntary 
contributions, perhaps led by nations interested in supporting and 
organizing the new country’s long term security. 
• Human Rights Investigations and War Crimes Tribunal: Funds 
could be needed to support investigations of atrocities and war 
crimes by a Security Council-mandated War Crimes Tribunal.  
These activities are normally funded by assessed contributions.  In 
addition, in the past tribunal activities have been complimented by 
human rights investigations that have been supported by voluntary 
contributions of interested nations. 
• Civil Administration: Funds may be needed to pay for the day-to-
day operations and salaries of several thousand persons of the Host 
Country’s civil administration.  This workforce includes firemen, 
police, teachers, hospital workers, civil servants and so forth.  This 
requirement will be funded, at least initially, by bilateral voluntary 
contributions from interested nations.  In the long run, self-
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generating revenues, such as customs, sales taxes, fees, and so 
forth, are the primary source of funding for civil administration. 
• Institution-building (Police, Justice, other): Funds are needed to 
invest in the establishment of institutions such as local police 
forces, a justice system, penal system, public information and free 
media, democratization, and branches of government.  Funds are 
also needed to pay for elections at the local and province level.  A 
collection of funding sources will be needed including a UN Trust 
Fund supported by bilateral voluntary contributions; bilateral 
nation-building development programs; and UN specialized 
agency programs to support institution-building efforts. 
• Elections & Democratization Processes: Funds are likely needed to 
pay for the conduct of democratic elections and related processes 
and activities.  This requirement is normally funded by bilateral 
voluntary contributions from interested States and NGOs. 
• Reconstruction/Development: Funds are needed to invest in the 
reconstruction and development.  This effort will be funded 
through a UN or World Bank Trust Fund supported by World 
Bank, a regional Development Bank and bilateral voluntary 
contributions.  Also, bilateral development programs, some already 
working in the territory, will continue to sponsor in-country 
projects. 
Since these requirements are to be funded from multiple sources, the SYG/SRSG 
should prepare a donor strategy and implementation plan, in collaboration with the World 
Bank, to organize donor campaigns and, where appropriate, target potential donors to 
take the lead in supporting key activities, particularly in the areas of civil administration, 
institution-building and reconstruction. 
The UN mission will have to take the lead in establishing a financial management 
capability and a budge for supporting the operations of the Host Country’s civil 
administration.  The UN or the World Bank will also need to establish and appropriate 
Trust Fund or other mechanism to encourage donors to provide funding as soon as it is 
needed. 
3.11 Lead Agency Responsibilities 
Define the areas of responsibility to different USG agencies and international 
organizations based on the concept operations.  These responsibilities are determine 
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through interagency discussions.  In some cases, clarify assigned tasks or functions that 
fall outside an agency’s normal area of responsibility. 
3.11.1  State Department (P, Region Bureau and Functional Offices (R, 
 IO, PM, PRM, INL, DRL, S-WCT, EB, L, S/RPP, etc.) 
3.11.2 USUN 
3.11.3 Defense (Regional Office and Functional Offices) 







4.0 PREPARATORY TASKS 
This section lays out specific preparatory tasks to be undertaken by the 
interagency before the operation begins—these include such tasks as advance diplomatic 
consultations, troop recruitment, verification of legal authorities, funding for the 
operation, congressional consultations, and U.S. media relations.  For each task noted 
below, there should be a discussion of the facts bearing on successful accomplishment of 
the task, requirements for action, agency responsibilities, and milestones for 
implementation.  Each sub-section below (4.1, 4.2, etc.) is usually drafted by one agency 
and coordinated with all other interested agencies. 
4.1 Advance Diplomatic Consultations (State lead with USUN, OSD) 
Outline our strategy for UN consultations, consultations with key regional 
powers, major powers, and the host government, consultations with regional 
organizations and supporting international organizations (OSCE, UNHCR, etc.) 
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4.2 Advance Intelligence Support Preparations (Intelligence Community  
lead) 
Describe how the IC will provide intel reports on the crisis and early warning of 
flashpoints to interagency policy-makers.  If appropriate, outline requirements for and 
make arrangements to have damage assessments developed and provided to the 
interagency.  Discuss guidelines for sharing of information with coalition partners, other 
participants from the international community, or regional organizations in the operation. 
4.3 Force Generation and Troop Recruitment (State lead with OSD, Joint  
Staff and USUN) 
Determine the coalition force structure and identify force requirements.  Identify 
potential troop contributors and plan for soliciting participation.  Clarify progress in on-
going recruitment efforts. 
4.4 Advance Coalition Arrangements and Leadership (State lead with OSD,  
Joint Staff and USUN) 
Determine the organization and lead nation for the coalition.  Prepare a charter for 
the Steering Group to provide policy control over coalition operations.  Make provisions 
for both military and civil command and control.  Establish coalition-planning staffs for 
military and civilian activities. 
4.5 Strategic Deployment and Logistics Arrangements (State lead with OSD  
and Joint Staff) 
Determine the coalition’s requirements for overflight rights, basing, and bed 
down.  This will require the establishment of an IWG (NSC, State-P, State-PM, OSD-
ISA, Joint Staff, DATTs, and the CINC) led by State-PM to coordinate making 




4.6 Funding Requirements and Sources (OMB lead with State, OSD and  
AID) 
Discuss the estimated USG cost of the operation, potential USG sources and 
adequacy of funding, interagency burden sharing—which USG agencies will pay for 
what, relevant funding authorities, and Congressional actions required for the expenditure 
of USG funds. 
4.7 Financial Donors (State lead with AID and Treasury) 
Determine overall financial requirements and identify potential donors.  Establish 
a fund to receive contributions.  Prepare appeals in consultation with relevant parties.  
Organize donor conferences.  Collaborate with UN agencies, international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.), develop banks, NGOs and bilateral donors. 
4.8 NEO Planning and Precautionary Arrangements (State lead with NSC, 
OSD and Joint Staff) 
Outline measures to evacuate non-combatant personnel and protect U.S. 
personnel and facilities. 
4.9 Legal Authority for Operations (NSC lead with all agencies) 
Specify the overall authority for conducting the operation, the key provisions of 
the mandate, requirements of the peace accord, if appropriate, the U.S. legal authority for 
providing support to the operation, and the status of SOFA arrangements. 
4.10 Advance Congressional Consultations (NSC lead with all agencies) 
Outline the strategy for gaining Congressional support for operation, the 
requirements for consultation/reporting to Congress, plan for dealing with key Members. 
4.11 Advance U.S. Public Relations and Media Affairs (NSC lead with State,  
OSD, Joint Staff and USUN) 
Describe the overall strategy for telling the story, the rules of road for media once 
operations begin, key themes and critical events, and key media outlets/people. 
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4.12 Advance International Public Diplomacy (State lead with NSC, OSD,  
Joint Staff, USUN and AID) 
Describe the overall strategy for conducting the public information campaign 
abroad.  Efforts will be coordinated by the International Public Information (IPI) working 
group. 
4.13 Interagency Rehearsal of Anticipated Operations (NSC lead with all  
agencies) 
Outline the plan for conducting the Deputies interagency rehearsal of the 
operation. 
4.14 Activities for Final Countdown and Onset of Operations (NSC lead with  
all agencies) 
Outline the timeline and activities (for use in a “Playbook”) to be completed 
during final countdown and onset of operations.  These may include legal notification, 
warning messages, evacuation of personnel, POTUS activities, final diplomatic 
notifications, final coalition activities, congressional briefings domestic public affairs and 
press operations, and international public information releases. 
4.15 Interagency Crisis Management Activities and Processes (NSC lead with  
all agencies) 
Discuss how the interagency will manage the crisis on a day-to-day basis.  
Discussion should include the establishment of “watch teams,” distribution of daily intel 
or diplomatic reports, timing of daily SVTS, and the schedule of Deputies or EXCOMM 
meetings, and interagency communications during the crisis. 
4.16 Hedging Strategies for Possible “What If” Scenarios (NSC lead with the  
NIC, State and OSD) 
Determine hedging strategies for the important “what if” scenarios.  These 
scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the Host Nation, warring factions, 
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neighboring states, a regional power, or a major power.  If these scenarios are large in 
number or are complex in nature, consider adding an additional section to the Pol-Mil 
Plan that addresses these “what ifs” and outline the hedging strategies and countermoves 
available to deal with them. 
4.X Other preparatory task may be added as appropriate 
5.0 MAJOR MISSION AREA TASKS 
This section provides an inventory of the major mission area tasks that could be 
undertaken as part of the complex contingency operation.  Although the content of this 
section may vary significantly from one operation to another, there are many common 
mission area tasks that are undertaken in most operations.  Others are consciously 
dismissed as not relevant to a specific situation. 
In writing a pol-mil plan, each mission area (e.g. 5.1. Diplomatic Engagement, 
etc.) will usually be tasked by the NSC to a specific lead agency for planning and 
preparation in coordination with other interested agencies.  Note in the inventory that the 
usual agencies designed as lead are listed. 
Mission area tasks for a complex contingency operation are designed to address 
immediate problems that, left unresolved, could lead to the return of fighting.  As such, 
the mission area tasks listed herein are distinct from normal, long-term developmental 
tasks. 
Note also that the overriding criterion for the establishment of task priorities is 
political-military, consistent with USG strategic purpose and mission as outlined in 
paragraph 2.0 above.  This criterion offers a useful way of deciding whether, for example, 
an admirable humanitarian project fits in with the USG purpose and mission of the 
operation. 
Since the set of mission area tasks undertaken for any given situation will vary 
from operation to operation, this inventory presents a list of tasks that may by 
undertaken—not all tasks will be applicable to every complex contingency operation.  
Other important aspects of this inventory are highlighted below: 
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• The selection of mission area tasks undertaken for a particular operation 
will have to account for the USG strategic purpose and mission, 
cooperation of the host government and the parties involved, and the 
resources available. 
• This inventory of mission area tasks is illustrative rather than prescriptive.  
The inventory only identifies tasks that are usually undertaken as part of a 
complex contingency operation.  Accordingly, the inventory can be used 
as a menu of potential tasks, based on lessons learned, to spur agency 
planners to consider the range of likely tasks appropriate for a given 
operation. 
• Effort has been made to list tasks within each mission area in some 
chronological sequence of execution, however, this sequence should not 
be interpreted rigidly. 
• The inventory does not specify which entities within the USG, the United 
Nations, NATO, OSCE, or OAU, ASEAN, or other organizations with 
undertake the task.  This needs to be developed as part of the overall pol-
mil strategy. 
In writing this portion of the Pol-Mil Plan, agencies should prepare a brief, 
executive-level overview that is one or two paragraphs in length following the general 
outline below: 
Mission Area Task (Lead and Supporting Agencies) 
• Current situation/operating environment 
• Operational requirement, task objectives and priorities of effort 
• Concept of operations and key milestones for successful task completion 
• Authorities/mandates/policy statements that may apply to task execution 
• Supporting agencies involved, their roles/responsibilities 
• Local institutional involved and nature of their participation/contribution 
• Other international organizations involved and their level of effort 
• Key financial, personal, asset, administrative, and logistical considerations 
• Unresolved issues, risks, anticipated challenges/difficulties 
Note that each task listed below under the various major mission areas does not 
identify the entity that will organize and implement the action, but rather only identifies 
the task using an action verb.  The agency planner must assess the situation and make a 
determination of the entity which is best able to perform the task, such as the USG, the 
UN, an NGO, the host nation, or a regional organization, among others. 
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5.1 Diplomatic Engagement Tasks (State, USUN, OSD, Treasury) 
• Consult with the host nation 
• Consult with regional powers and neighboring states 
• Collaborate with the UN and regional organizations (OAU, OAS, OSCE, 
ASEAN, etc.) 
• Consult with supporting international organizations (UNHCR, Red Cross) 
• Establish a “Friends Group” or a “Peace Implementation Council” 
• Appoint a Special Envoy 
• Conduct negotiations between the parties of the conflict 
• Support mediation efforts/negotiations with the parties 
• Develop a strategy for dealing with strongmen or de facto warlords 
• Formulate UNSC resolutions for collective action 
• Collaborate with troop contributing nations 
• Impose or lift sanctions/arms embargo 
• Maintain compliance with the peace accord milestones and conditions 
• Gain diplomatic recognition of a government 
5.2 Military Security and Regional Stability Tasks (OSD, Joint Staff, State,  
AID, CIA) 
• Deter hostilities and armed attacks 
• Assess, train and equip coalition forces 
• Conduct military operations to accomplish the mandate 
• Provide intelligence support to the operation 
• Establish a military observer or a peacekeeping mission 
• Implement a weapons control regime 
• Disarm, demobilize, or reduce military units 
• Demilitarize a zone or region 
• Re-integrate ex-combatants 
• Conduct constabulary operations 
• Implement confidence-building and security measures 
• Professionalize/restructure military forces 
• Establish mil-to-mil programs 
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• Coordinate NATO support to the operation 
• Provide security assistance to the host nation 
• Conduct transition planning, hand-off, and military drawdown 
• Develop U.S. position on compensation/payments for collateral damage 
• Establish a foundation for post-conflict regional stability 
5.3 WMD Control/Consequence Management (OSD, Joint Staff, State,  
DSWA) 
• Prevent the sale, transfer, or migration of WMD systems and technical 
knowledge 
• Control/neutralize/remove WMD threat and capabilities 
• Safeguard/secure/dismantle WMD research personnel, records, facilities, 
etc. 
• Conduct consequence management contingencies 
5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Tasks (State, AID, OFDA, OSD) 
Humanitarian Relief 
• Pre-position humanitarian relief stocks 
• Provide emergency humanitarian relief—water, food, shelter, 
medical supplies 
• Organize humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas 
• Coordinate non-government and private organization activities 
• Restore damaged potable water sources 
• Repair sanitary latrine and capabilities for sewage disposal 
• Assist in restoring local health delivery services 
• Rehabilitate damaged food production capacities 
• Provide special assistance to vulnerable groups 
• Provide basic training and education in preventative measures 
Refugees 
• Avoid generation of population movements from home towns 
• Repatriate or resettle refugees and displaced persons 
• Provide housing and public services for returning people 
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• Organize food-for-work efforts (demining, road repair, security, 
etc.) 
Demining Operations 
• Assess the landmine clearance problem 
• Solicit financial support for landmine operations 
• Create a landmine clearance authority and conduct operations 
• Organize mine awareness training 
5.5 Internal Political Transition Tasks (State) 
• Conceptualize a workable political framework for the peace process 
• Encourage adoption of effective power-sharing arrangements 
• Release and assist political prisoners 
• Create confidence-building measures among warring factions 
• Foster the establishment of an effective interim or transition government 
• Develop staffing and funding for the interim of transition government 
• Create consensus-building mechanisms—national commissions, etc. 
• Assist in restoring the government’s administrative apparatus 
• Develop a political action plan for collaboration on functions for civil 
administration 
• Assist in the conduct of nation-wide free and fair elections 
• Assist in informing and educating newly-elected political leaders 
• Offer advisory assistance to government officials 
• Monitor and report on corruption by government officials 
• Transfer control of administrative functions from UN to host nation 
officials 
5.6 Civil Law and Order/Public Security Tasks (State, Justice) 
• Reform or disband existing police forces 
• Establish a new police force 
• Provide equipment and conduct police training for police forces 
• Establish a CIVPOL monitor activity 
• Recruit qualified civilian police monitors 
• Provide advisors to police and criminal justice organizations 
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• Support the establishment of local police operations 
• Provide capabilities to deal with civil disturbances 
• Rebuild the criminal justice system 
• Assist in establishing a humane prison system 
• Assist in establishing a legitimate legal system 
• Eradicate police corruption 
• Support judicial reform and local dispute resolution 
• Combat organized international crime activity and corruption 
• Safeguard government institutions and key leaders 
5.7 Infrastructure Restoration Tasks (State, AID) 
• Reconstitute energy supplies and restore basic services 
• Rehabilitate agricultural capacity 
• Restore facilities for power generation and transmission; fuse power grids 
• Repair transportation facilities and systems 
• Restore communications systems 
• Advise on planning for mineral and industrial production revitalization 
• Advise on natural resource management 
• Monitor environmental damage controls 
5.8 Economic Restoration/Transformation Tasks (State, AID, Treasury) 
• Restore opportunities for employment and private home ownership 
• Provide job training and employment for discharged military personnel 
• Assist in economic integration and cooperation 
• Streamline government administration and licensing 
• Eliminate corruption 
• Initiate privatization under market economy 
• Monitor natural resource management 
• Mobilize domestic and foreign investment capital 
5.9 Public Diplomacy and Education Tasks (State, OSD, Joint Staff) 
• Conduct public diplomacy (e.g. PSYOPS) operations 
• Conduct public opinion research 
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• Assist in establishing open broadcast networks 
• Discourage “hate radio” broadcasts 
• Promote understanding of civic values, rule of law, and citizen 
responsibilities 
• Provide unbiased historical information on the conflict 
• Sponsor journalist training and professional standards 
• Conduct public education and media training programs 
5.10 Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Tasks (State, Justice) 
• Engage the UN Human Rights Commission 
• Establish a Commission of Inquiry 
• Establish a clearing house for information and evidence 
• Constitute an office in the mission to address war crimes issues 
• Train military mission personnel on war crimes investigation support 
• Gain access to refugee camps and conduct interviews 
• Set up an atrocity reporting system and compile atrocity reports 
• Locate and protect possible sites of atrocities 
• Maintain data on sites—digital pictures, maps, witness reports, etc. 
• Deploy forensic teams with equipment to conduct investigations 
• Provide protection to the sites, witnesses, and investigation personnel 
• Develop an effective witness protection program 
• Seek removal of possible abusive police and law enforcement officials 
• Consult on appointing a UN Special Reporter to advise on human rights 
matters 
5.11 National Reconciliation Tasks (State, AID) 
• Assist in establishing a truth commission or international tribunal 
• Deployment a human rights monitoring mission 
• Provide human rights training to military, police and judicial officials 
• Monitor human rights practices and promote human rights standards 
• Seek legislation for amnesty of ex-combatants 
• Search for evidence of missing persons 
• Strengthen mechanisms to ensure government accountability 
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• Establish civil affairs operations in local areas 
• Assist in capacity-building for social institutions 
• Arrange for travel and reunion of families 
5.X Other mission areas may be added as appropriate 
6.0 AGENCY PLANS 
This section outlines important agency plans that are to be written by USG or UN 
agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation.  For each critical task of the 
operation noted in section 5 above, the ExComm will task USG agencies to write an 
agency operational or support plan for implementation (note below some of the common 
operational and support plans required for a complex contingency).  The ExComm 
determines, in consultation with NSC staff, which agency plans will be written for the 
complex contingency operation. 
The format for these plans should follow a standard pattern for consistency and 
common understanding.  Agency plans should at least discuss: 
• Purpose of the plan 
• Background on how the plan supports the overall operation 
• Planning assumptions 
• Current operating environment and situation on the ground 
• Operational mission and objectives 
• Desired operational end state and measures of success 
• Concept of operations—how the activity will unfold and timelines 
• Organizational framework for the activity and its chain of command 
• Lead agency and other supporting agencies involved and their 
roles/responsibilities 
• Local institutions involved and their roles/responsibilities 
• Other international actors/organizations involved 
• Financial, personnel, asset management, administrative, and logistical 
instructions 
• Other specific coordinating instructions 
• Unresolved issues, risks and anticipated challenges/difficulties 
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The interagency policy-level steering group (e.g., usually the ExComm) will 
review each of these plans to identify areas of interdependence between agencies (e.g., 
AID cannot do x until DoD does y), areas of disagreement (e.g., two agencies each think 
the other should pay for x), and the degree of consistency between agency plans and the 
overall pol-mil plan.  The ExComm review will normally take place off-site at NDU or 
Carlisle and will include Director-level participation or higher. 
In addition, the Deputies Committee will conduct an interagency rehearsal to 
review the Pol-Mil plan and supporting agency plans prior to commencement of 
operations. 
Depending on mission requirements, here are some common major mission areas 
that will require an agency plan for a complex contingency operation: 
 6.1 Plan for Recruiting the International Coalition (State) 
 6.2 Plan for Military Operations (Joint Staff) 
 6.3 Plan for Humanitarian Relief Operations (AID) 
 6.4 Plan for Civilian Police Equip and Train (State, Justice) 
 6.5 Plan for Demobilization of Forces (AID-OTI) 
 6.6 Plan for Restoration of Basic Services (AID) 
 6.7 Plan for Refugee Return (State) 
 6.8 Plan for Apprehension and Prosecution of War Criminals (State,  
Justice) 
 6.9 Plan for Public Diplomacy (State) 







A – Regional Map 
Provide a regional map of the area of operations.  Overprinted maps with key 
information, such as the location of refugee camps, areas of military control by the 
factions, or economic spheres of influence, should also be included in this appendix. 
B – Intelligence Assessment 
Provide the fully classified version of the intelligence assessment for the mission. 
C – Mission Organization and Footprint 
In graphic form, define the civilian and military organization of the mission.  
Also, using a map picture, depict the geographic footprint of the mission on the ground. 
D – Troop Contributors and International Participants  
Summarize the list of contributors, participants and supporters of the mission.  
This list should be available for use in both diplomatic and public information activities. 
E – Phases of Military Operations 
As provided by the Pentagon, outline the phases of the military operation. 
F – Summary of Key Decisions 
In graphic form, provide on a timeline the key policy decisions that the Principals 
or Deputies will likely have to address as the operation unfolds over the next six-nine 
months. 
G – Pol-Mil Strategic Timeline for Start-up 
On a matrix, outline the timeline of key strategic events for mission start-up.  Key 
pol-mil aspects usually include regional diplomatic activities, Security Council decisions, 





H – Pol-Mil Operational Synchronization Matrix  
On a matrix, outline the timeline of key operational events for mission progress 
over the next six months.  Key pol-mil aspects usually include political, military, relief, 
and return efforts as a minimum. 
I – Playbook for Final Countdown 
On a short timeline covering the last few days and hours leading up to and 
following H-Hour, outline the key activities (as outlined in Section 4 above) within the 
USG to be taken at the outset by the White House and other agencies to ensure 
coordinated implementation of mission. 
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APPENDIX C: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)  
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 JUNE 1999139 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,  
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 
September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these 
resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all 
terrorist acts by any party, 
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, 
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their 
homes in safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis 
adopted on 6 May 1999 (S.1999.516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the 
acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to                                                  
139 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 265-267 and 274-278.  
 116
9 of the paper presented to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this 
resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the 
region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and 
meaningful self-administration for Kosovo, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the 
implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and 
acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the 
general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required 
elements in annex 2; 
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the 
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the 
full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an 
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and 
complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and 
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the 
international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; 
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb 
military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the 
functions in accordance with annex 2; 
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of 
international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as 
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required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such 
presences; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security 
Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil 
presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special 
Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure 
that both presences operate towards the same goals in a mutually supportive manner; 
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish 
the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all 
necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil 
and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their 
deployment; 
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be 
deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: 
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal 
and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of 
annex 2; 
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; 
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons 
can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional 
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, 
take over responsibility for this task; 
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(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence; 
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international 
civil presence, and other international organizations; 
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will 
include: 
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the 
Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required; 
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the 
holding of elections; 
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local 
provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, 
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
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(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; 
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displace persons to 
their homes in Kosovo; 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure 
the fast and effective delivery of international aid; 
13. Encourages all Member States and international organization to contribute to 
economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international 
donors’ conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the 
earliest possible date; 
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international 
security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end 
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization 
as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General; 
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16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 
(1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil 
and security presences; 
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international 
organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and 
stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of 
a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order 
to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional 
cooperation; 
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of 
all aspects of this resolution; 
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for 
an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides 
otherwise; 
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on 
the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the 
international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days 
of the adoption of this resolution; 
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
Annex 1. Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre, 6 May 1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political 
solution to the Kosovo crisis: 
• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 
• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security 
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; 
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• Establishing of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the 
Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful 
and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; 
• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 
• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for 
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization 
of the KLA; 
• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization 
of the crisis region. 
 
Annex 2. Proposal Presented by Martii Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin to President 
Slobodan Milosevic, 2 June 1999, as Approved by the Yugoslav Parliament 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of 
the Kosovo crisis; 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international 
civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control 
and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to 
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the 
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by 
the Security Council of the United Nations.  The interim administration to provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal like for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 
permitted to return to perform the following functions: 
• Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security 
presence; 
• Marking/clearing minefields; 
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• Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
• Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries 
of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK.  Negotiations between the parties 
for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-
governing institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
crisis region.  This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-
Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further 
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth 
above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, 
which are specified in the footnote below.  A military-technical agreement will 
then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional 
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslavia/Serb personnel in 
Kosovo: 
Withdrawal 
• Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and 
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be 
withdrawn; 
Returning personnel 
• Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
• Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 
• Timetable for their return; 
• Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
• Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence 
and the international civil mission. 
FOOTNOTE. Other required elements: a rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, 
meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn 
outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; return of personnel for the 
four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security 
presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands). 
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Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable 
withdrawals.  The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not 
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